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INTRODUCTION
The number and variety of media outlets in the United States far
exceed those in any other nation. Sixty percent of American homes
receive cable television service, enabling the average household to
view twenty-seven different channels.1 Over 10,000 radio stations
compete for listeners and over 40,000 journals and magazines are
published in the United States every year.2 As media outlets have
expanded, so have the number of commercial messages reaching the
average consumer. Network television 3 commercials, for example,
have increased greatly. From 1965 to 1990, the number of
commercials shown on network television increased threefold, from
approximately 1,800 to almost 5,400 per year.4 Moreover, this
number increases 20% annually.5 Networks can broadcast five or
six consecutive advertisements during a single commercial break,
averaging 10.5 minutes of commercial time per hour of prime-time
programming.
6
t B.S. 1987, Cornell University;J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Pennsylvania.
The author wishes to thank Professor C. Edwin Baker for his advice, guidance, and
wisdom throughout the writing of this Comment.
I See Peter F. Eder, Advertising and Mass Marketing: The Threat and the Promise,
FUTURIST, May 1990, at 38.
2 See id.
In this Comment, "network television" refers to the programming of the four
largest broadcasting networks: American Broadcasting Company (ABC), Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS), National Broadcasting Company (NBC), and Fox
Broadcasting Network (Fox). The Federal Communication Commission (FCC),
however, recognizes only ABC, CBS, and NBC as networks; it defines a network "as
having weekly programming of 15 hours or more during prime-time." See Brian
Donlon, Network's Great Chase: Big Three in Pursuit of Survival, USA TODAY, May 21,
1991, at ID. Fox does not fall under the FCC definition, since it offers only 12 hours
a week of prime-time programming. See id.
4 See Eder, supra note 1, at 38.
5 See id.
6 See id. "Prime-time" consists of the most highly watched portions of each
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Television has become the most influential mass medium in the
United States. 7 Its images permeate public and private spaces.
8
Television sets are found in virtually every home and they also
crowd airports, bus and train stations, hospitals, lobbies, restaurants,
nightclubs, and even parks and beaches. 9 Because news, public
affairs, and entertainment programs reflect and shape the dominant
values and norms in society, advocacy and special-interest groups
have made concerted efforts to control substantive media con-
tent.
10
To better understand the types of reforms that advocacy groups
seek, it is useful to classify the groups according to their social
status, goals, and the extent to which they want to alter the content
of the medium." Conservative and religious groups view televi-
sion as an intrusive threat to morals and Christian values and
therefore seek to pressure the industry to prevent the degradation
of society that results from the projection of alternative values.
12
Similarly, antiviolence groups find fault with television's excessive
glorification of violence.1 3 These organizations seek to reduce or
eliminate violence from television, arguing that continued exposure
to violence will produce a violent society.14 Social-activist groups,
such as environmental organizations, regard television as an
"electronic classroom" in which society can most effectively learn
about the issues and crises on the organizations' agendas.15 They
want to incorporate educational messages about birth control, AIDS,
arms control, and drug and alcohol abuse into television program-
ming.16 Status-based interest groups, including women, homosex-
uals, seniors, the disabled, and racial minorities perceive television
as a "cultural mirror" that has failed to "reflect their [own] image[s]
network's schedule: those programs shown between 8:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m each
evening, and starting at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday. See Robert Lenzner, Prime-Time Faceoff
forBigMoney: New York, Hollywood in a Power Struggle, BOSTON GLOBE,June 10, 1990,
at Al.
7 See KATHERINE MONTGOMERY, TARGET: PRIME TIME 6 (1989).
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See id.
1 For a comprehensive discussion of Professor Montgomery's classification
scheme, see id. at 8-9.
12 See id.
is See id. at 9.
14 See id.
15 See id. at 8.
16 See id.
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accurately." 17 They seek "fuller and more positive representation"
in television, because the medium threatens their rights as citizens
when it treats them unfairly, excludes them, or only marginally
includes them.
1 8
Advocacy groups have difficulty influencing the substantive
content of television programming since their members are often
not included in the production and selection process. Instead,
advocacy groups express their views by picketing the networks
Ig
and lobbying governmental authorities for increased regulation.
20
More successful is the consumer boycott, which appears to be the
weapon-of-choice in the advocacy group arsenal.2 1 By using their
economic power to threaten not to purchase products from
advertisers or sponsors of programs in which their views are not
represented or are unfairly characterized, advocacy groups have
made the networks and advertisers more responsive to their
concerns.
This Comment examines the effects of consumer boycotts by
advocacy groups on the substantive content of network television
programming. Section I examines the limits of constitutional and
ethical protection afforded boycotts. Section II explores the
relationship between advocacy groups and the medium, focusing on
the activities and complaints of individuals and organizations who
have achieved a degree of prominence and notoriety in the industry.
Through a series of comprehensive case studies, Section III
examines how boycotts affect the presentation of three issues:
abortion, homosexuality, and environmentalism. Finally, Section IV
advocates two media policy reforms-content-blind purchasing of
commercial air time and advocacy group internal network regula-
tion-and evaluates how these proposals will operate within the
current constitutional and regulatory regime.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 183-94.
20 See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
21 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 10; infra text accompanying notes 106-11,
122-27.
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I. DERIVING A CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR
CONSUMER BOYCOTTS
Expressive boycotts have long been an effective means of
political communication. "From the colonists' protest of the Stamp
and Townsend Acts to the... National Organization for Women's
[(NOW)] campaign to encourage ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment, boycotts have played a central role in our [n]ation's
political discourse."22 Their foundation in American history,
importance as a mode of expression, and susceptibility to content-
based regulations may require that restrictions on boycotts be
scrutinized with special care.23 Although consumer boycotts of
television advertisers may appear to be destructive and illegal efforts
that infringe upon the rights of the television industry, recent case
law affords such boycotts constitutional protection.
A. Developing a Constitutional Protection for Politically Motivated
Boycotts in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
Until the Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.,24 the Court indicated that "rational economic policy
reasons" could justify the regulation of peaceful consumer boy-
cotts.25 In Claiborne Hardware, however, the Court declared a "new
consumer right to engage in concerted refusals to patronize even if
22 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 493 U.S. 411,
447 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Missouri v. National Org. for Women,
620 F.2d 1301, 1319 (8th Cir.) (holding that NOW's Missouri convention boycott of
states that had not ratified the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, while causing
Missouri to suffer revenue losses, was "privileged on the basis of the First Amend-
ment right to petition"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
23 See Federal Trade Comm'n, 493 U.S. at 448 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) ("In places which
by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,
the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.")); see also
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 532 n.10 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that content-based distinctions in defining exceptions to a
billboard ordinance "must be scrutinized with special care").
24 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
25 Michael C. Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware and its Implications forAmerican LaborLaw, 93 YALE L.J. 409,409
(1984); see id. at 409 n.2 (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001,
447 U.S. 607 (1980) (denying constitutional protection to underwriter unions'
picketing of insurance companies, since insurance companies derived over 90% of
their income from the sale of underwriter's policies and successful secondary
picketing would force the insurance companies to choose between their survival and
the severance of their ties with the underwriter)).
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such refusals are economically disruptive." 26 This case arose from
a black citizens' consumer boycott of white merchants in Claiborne
County, Mississippi, aimed at compelling white elected officials to
support demands by civic and business leaders for racial equality
and integration.27 On common law tort grounds, the Mississippi
court upheld a lower-court judgment for injunctive relief and
damages, finding that the protesters had used "illegal force,
violence, and threats against the peace" to effectuate the boycott.
28
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed,
holding that "[t]he right of the States to regulate economic activity
could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent,
politically motivated boycott designed to force governmental and
economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the
Constitution itself."2 9 Accordingly, the Court found the nonvio-
lent elements of the NAACP's activities entitled to First Amendment
protection.
3 0
The Claiborne Hardware Court drew a critical distinction between
(1) pure economic boycott activity and unfair trade practices, which
can be restricted by antitrust laws, 31 and (2) peaceful political
boycotts, which should not be regulated, since "expression on public
issues 'has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values.'"3 2 In supporting this differentiation, the
Court recognized the importance of collective activity in political
areas: "'IT]he practice of persons sharing common views banding
together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the
26 Id. at 409. Professor Harper notes that several Fifth Circuit decisions
"presaged" the Claibome Hardware decision. Id. at 409 n.2 (citing Henry v. First Nat'l
Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 302-04 (5th Cir. 1979) (giving First Amendment
protection of political speech and association to picketing and boycotting in protest
of racial discrimination), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980)); see also Machesky v.
Brizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1969) (declaring an injunction restricting
picketing, congregation, and boycotting in city business areas to be constitutionally
overbroad, since it "collides with the paramount institutional interests protected by
the First Amendment").
27 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 889.
28 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1301 (Miss. 1980), rev'd,
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
29 ClaiborneHardware, 458 U.S. at 914 (emphasis added). Although a general First
Amendment protection was found, the Court "did not squarely rest [its assertion] on
any First Amendment... precedent." Harper, supra note 25, at 409.
So See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 915.
31 See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607,616 (holding that
secondary picketing can be prohibited without violating the First Amendment).
32 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,467
(1980)).
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American political process .... [B]y collective effort individuals can
make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be
faint or lost."'
38
B. Extending the Meaning of Political Activity:
Environmental Planning Informational Council v. Superior Court
After the Claiborne Hardware decision, it was unclear how
broadly courts would construe the meaning of political activity.
3 4
Would joining a consumer boycott, for example, be conceived as a
"constitutionally protected political act" or would the conception of
boycotts as protected political activities be "limited to those aimed
at affecting governmental decisionmaking?" 35 The Supreme Court
of California recently addressed this question in Environmental
Planning and Information Council v. Superior Court.3 6 In this case,
a newspaper publisher brought an action for injunctive relief and
punitive and compensatory damages against a nonprofit environ-
mental organization. Critical of the newspaper's editorial policies
on environmental matters, the environmental group had called for
a boycott of companies that advertised in the newspaper.3 7 The
California court expressly rejected the publisher's argument that
only civil rights boycotts should be afforded constitutional protec-
tion, characterizing the organization's activity as a "'politically
motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic
change.'"38 "[T]he fact that the change which they seek bears
upon environmental quality rather than racial equality, can hardly
support a different result."39 The court emphasized that it was
"precluded by the First Amendment itself from gauging the degree
33 Id. at 907-08 (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
294 (1981)).
m See, e.g., Harper, supra note 25, at 413 (noting that "a right to boycott is difficult
to place in any of the lines of First Amendment precedent the Court has developed
in this century").
s5 Id. at 422. Professor Harper argues:
Even boycotts aimed solely at private decisionmaking should share the status
of other political acts such as electoral voting, contributing money and time
to an election or referendum campaign, and litigating for social purposes.
All of these political actions can be viewed broadly as means by which
citizens can influence important social decisionmaking.
Id. (footnote omitted).
36 680 P.2d 1086 (Cal. 1984).
37 See id. at 1088.
38 Id. at 1091 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886,914 (1982)).
39 Id. at 1092.
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of constitutional protection by the content or subject matter of the
speech: '[T]here is an "equality of status" in the field of ideas.'"
40
The Environmental Planning court held the boycotters' activity to
be constitutionally protected even though it was aimed at changing
the editorial policies of the newspaper:
The freedom of a newspaper to formulate editorial policies is
obviously of great value in our society, and the spectacle of
different groups seeking to influence those policies through the
use of economic boycott is troublesome to contemplate. Yet, the
newspaper is not in a position to claim infringement of its own
constitutional rights by such conduct, since no governmental
action is implicated, and the degree of economic coercion which
exists may be no greater than that which might lawfully be exerted
by an advertiser who, on his own, seeks to influence editorial
policy by withdrawing or threatening to withdraw its patronage.
The market place of ideas contemplated by the First Amendment
cannot be so insulated.
41
Consequently, consumer boycotts aimed at changing the
substantive content of a program or the editorial policies of a
television network would likely be granted similar protection. If the
organization's objective is to influence mass media policy, rather
than one of economic gain, courts will hesitate to interfere with the
activities of the advocacy group.42  For example, a minority
group's boycott effected to increase the group's access to and
visibility in network programming would invoke interests similar to
those of the citizens in Claiborne Hardware. Similarly, a religious
group's boycott, designed to encourage the depiction of "traditional
values," would receive protection under Environmental Planning.
Therefore, media reform which addresses the effects of advocacy-
group boycotting must be consistent with the constitutional right
advanced in Environmental Planning and in Claiborne Hardware.
40 Id. (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OFTHE
PEOPLE 27 (1948))).
41 Id. (citation omitted).
42 See e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior CourtTrial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S.
411 (1990) (providing no constitutional protection for lawyers who, acting as court-
appointed counsel for indigent defendants, boycotted for increased compensation).
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C. Th6 Ethics of Consumer Boycotts: Beyond the
Constitutional Protection
Claiborne Hardware and Environmental Planning appear to define
a constitutional right to boycott network television advertisers
similar to the right historically afforded expressive boycotts. Some
elements of these advertiser boycotts, however, are distinguishable
from more traditional politically motivated activities. Professor
Alan Dershowitz has questioned the presumption that sponsor
boycotts are acceptable, arguing that "'although most boycotts are
constitutionally protected, some of them are morally wrong.
' "43
At a 1981 broadcast industry gathering, he commented:
"Surely it is more appropriate to boycott an advertiser who plays
an active role in determining content than one who plays no role.
If, for example, a sponsor were to say, 'I'll advertise on this show
only if there are more exposed breasts, or it puts down gays, or if
it casts a Klan member as Martin Luther King,' then the propriety
of an economic boycott becomes more obvious. But if the sponsor
merely declines to remove his ad from an objectionable show, the
propriety of a general product boycott becomes more question-
able."
44
Similarly, many consumer boycotts, specifically those engineered
by the conservative/religious and antiviolence groups, aim to
restrict the public's viewing options and curtail the expressive rights
of television producers and networks.45 These advocacy groups
boycott to reduce network-programming content that does not
conform with their agendas, resulting in the elimination of certain
43 MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 162 (quoting Alan Dershowitz).
44 Id. Professor Dershowitz has long opposed the tactics of advocacy group
boycotts. For example, he was a strong supporter of Bob Guccione, whose Penthouse
magazine prompted ReverendJerry Falwell's Liberty Foundation to boycott 7-Eleven
stores for selling "adult" magazines. Dershowitz observed that Guccione's magazines
were attacked "solely because they do not conform to the single-minded religious,
moral and behavioral standards ofJerry Falwell and other fundamentalist zealots."
Penthouse Fights Moral Majority, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 1986, § 1, at 24. Professor
Dershowitz also picketed in support of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, which had
cancelled the opera-oratorio Oedipus Rex, due to narrator Vanessa Redgrave's ardent
support of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Although Dershowitz defended
Redgrave's right to perform, he stated that he also supported the orchestra's right to
.exercise its freedom of association by refusing to perform with a PLO collaborator."
Michael S. Serrill, Art Silenced or Preserved?: Vanessa Redgrave Charges Blacklisting by the
B.S.O., TIME, Nov. 12, 1984, at 88.
45 For a discussion of Reverend Donald Wildmon's attempts to affect program-
ming content, see infra notes 53-111 and accompanying text.
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issues from programming.46  This purpose, however, directly
conflicts with the First Amendment principle of encouraging speech
and increasing public debate and contrasts with the goals of social-
activist and status-based interest groups, which are typically
concerned with the lack of visibility of their views and consequen-
tially seek increased access to the medium. This quest for increased
access closely parallels the colonists' Stamp and Townsend Acts
protests and NOW's Equal Rights campaign; it therefore seems
appropriate to pursue this objective through advertiser boycotts.
Finally, an advertiser boycott that is viewed as a restriction or
limitation on the speech of the producer and network could be
subject to regulation under United States v. O'Brien.4 7 The O'Brien
standard states:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an impor-
tant or substantial governmental interest; if the government
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
48
Essentially, the government has the "authority to regulate
expressive conduct when the regulation protects countervailing
rights and is not directed at the content of the expression."49 The
government arguably could restrict these organized refusals to
patronize because it has a legitimate interest in averting disruption
of the economy and protecting the First Amendment expressive
rights of those whose programming is attacked.50 It is possible
that these countervailing interests, in the aggregate, would be
sufficient to justify government regulation of advocacy group
boycotts in this narrowly-defined situation.
Therefore, although Claiborne Hardware and Environmental
Planning appear to define a constitutional right of consumer
boycotting, it is questionable how much protection should be
afforded advocacy groups acts directed toward network television
sponsors. Since advocacy group boycotts are targeted against
46 Wildmon, for example, has threatened boycotts to eliminate both the depiction
of homosexuality and abortion. See infra notes 53-111 and accompanying text.
47 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
4
1 Id. at 377. The Environmental Planning court, however, did notincorporate the
O'Brien test in its analysis.
41 Harper, supra note 25, at 414.
50 See id.
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advertisers, who arguably have the least creative control over
substantive programming content in the broadcast system,51 the
ethical propriety of such boycott efforts is disputable.5 2 Further-
more, boycotts that threaten to interfere with countervailing
economic and First Amendment rights of television producers and
networks arguably may be regulated under O'Brien. Nevertheless,
since advocacy group boycotts are currently afforded constitutional
protection, any proposed media reform must necessarily be
narrowly tailored to address only the effects and not the expressive
components of the boycott activity.
II. PROFILES OF PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS
IN TELEVISION REFORM
The effectiveness of a consumer boycott depends on the
convictions and efforts of the leaders of the advocacy group and the
type of reform sought. When advertisers and networks believe that
an advocacy group's position represents a majority view, they are
more likely to respond to its concerns. However, there is often a
disparity between the claimed majority opinion and the actual one.
This disparity is evident in the profiles below which analyze the
impacts of individual advocates and advocacy groups on network
television content and advertising support.
A. Reverend Donald Wildmon's Fight Against
"Objectionable" Television
In 1976, Reverend Donald Wildmon experienced a "prime-time
epiphany."53 As he sat with his family for a relaxing evening of
television viewing, he became enraged when he found only
programs filled with violence, profanity, and sexual innuendo.
54
As he recounted in Time magazine:
"I sat down one night to watch television with my family. All I
wanted to do was be entertained. Very shortly into the program,
somebody wasjumping into bed with somebody else's wife, a scene
51 See infra text accompanying notes 274-83.
52 Although advertisers arguably exercise indirect control over programming
content, by deciding whether or not to sponsor a program, they have no creative
input, unlike writers or producers. Therefore, whatever the effectiveness of advertiser
boycotts, a boycott of those directly responsible for programming content appears
more appropriate.
53 Righteous Watcher of the Airwaves, TIME, July 6, 1981, at 20.
54 See id.
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of adultery. Of course it was normal, approved-you know, there
was no kind of condemnation or showing it as being wrong. I
asked the children to change the channel. I got into another
program, which we watched for five minutes or so, and the first
thing I know, somebody has called somebody else an s.o.b., but
they didn't use the initials. And I asked my children to change the
channel again. This was in 1976, and we had three networks plus
PBS. I got involved in a pretty good mystery, and all of a sudden
the scene changed and one man has another man tied down and
is working him over with a hammer. I asked the children to get up
and turn the set off. That's all I'd ever been told to do: If you
don't like what's on television, turn it off. Then I realized that I'm
a part of a whole, larger social group, and what goes on in society,
especially in the television industry, is going to affect me and my
family and my children-they were small at that point. And I then
realized that I should try to do something about this."
5 5
Wildmon was so angry that he gave up his position as a
Methodist minister in a suburban Memphis congregation and
formed the National Federation for Decency (Federation),56 an
advocacy group for members "disgusted with the cheap, violent and
vulgar programming on television" and devoted to effecting change
through the use of economic boycotts. 57 One of the Federation's
initial acts was a highly publicized boycott of television in March
1977, which Wildmon claimed was "'greatly responsible for a drop
of 1 million households daytime and one quarter of a million
households prime-time from March to December of 1977.
'"58
Industry officials, however, attributed the decline to competition
from cable television and motion pictures and the entrance of
women into the labor market.
5 9
The Coalition for Better Television (Coalition) was formed in
February 1981,60 with Wildmon as its chairperson. 61 Represent-
ing approximately 300 religious and community groups, 62 includ-
55 Don Winbush, Bringing Satan to Heel, TIME, June 19, 1989, at 54 (quoting
Donald Wildmon).
56 See Righteous Watcher of the Airwaves, supra note 53, at 20.
57 New TV Season: Less Sex, Less Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 11,
1978, at 32.
58 Id. (quoting Donald Wildmon).
59 See id.
60 See N.R. Kleinfield, TV Moral Monitors to Press Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
1981, at DI.
61 See Curtis Coghlan, UPI, Feb. 12, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
file.
62 See Kleinfield, supra note 60, at D18.
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ing his own Federation and Reverend Jerry Falwell's Moral Majori-
ty,63 the organization claimed support from 3.5 million families
nationwide.6 4 For the next three months, approximately 4,000
Coalition volunteers noted the television programs they found
offensive and the companies that advertised their products during
commercial breaks in those programs.65 The results were used to
determine the advertisers that most commonly supported programs
containing "excessive sex, violence and profanity."66 Wildmon
announced that, once the list was completed, a boycott of the most
frequent offenders would be launched.67  Surprisingly, after
meeting with officials from several consumer products companies,
however, the Coalition cancelled the planned boycott.68 At a press
conference in Washington, D.C., Wildmon explained that "'advertis-
ers have listened to us and our concerns, and basically share our
concerns.'"
6 9
In the years following the 1981 attack on network television,
Wildmon's efforts were infrequently publicized until 1986, when he
formed Christian Leaders for Responsible Television (CLeaR-TV),
a coalition of 1,600 Protestant ministers and Roman Catholic
priests. 70 The group, arguably the most vocal and influential
advocacy organization today, claims to represent 60 million
Americans. 71 Initially, CLeaR-TV sought television reform by
meeting directly with officials from the major networks. 72 Wild-
mon, however, was dissatisfied with the responses. "'I talked about
decency and the concern for society and the children .... And
they used the same words that I used. But we certainly didn't mean
the same thing by them.'"
7 3
63 See id; Why Sex and Violence Won't Wash With Procter and Gamble, EcONOMIST,
June 27, 1981, at 21 [hereinafter Sex and Violence].
" See Coghlan, supra note 61. This figure was later quoted to be as high as 5
million families nationwide. See Gerald Clarke, Sanitizing the Small Screen: Proctor &
Gamble Joins the Networks' Sex-and-Violence Critics, TIME, June 29, 1981, at 83.
65 See Clarke, supra note 64, at 83; Sex and Violence, supra note 63, at 21.
6 Sex and Violence, supra note 63, at 21.
67 See Chemical Marketers Feel Anti-TV Pressure, CHEMICAL WEEK, July 8, 1981, at
18.
68 See id.
69 Id. (quoting Donald Wildmon).
70 See Larry Black, Burger King Forced to Eat Its Words, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 11,
1990, at 8;James Cox, Rev. Donald Wildmon: Mississippi Minister Takes on TVNetworks,
USA ToDAY, July 17, 1989, at 6B.
71 See Black, supra note 70, at 8.
72 See Winbush, supra note 55, at 54.
73 Id. (quoting Donald Wildmon).
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Consequently, Wildmon re-focused his efforts on the advertisers
because, unlike the networks, "'[a]dvertisers don't give you a cold
shoulder. They want to be your friend.'" 74  He established a
television monitoring system in the west Tupelo offices of the
American Family Association (AFA).75 As of July 1989, twenty-two
employees review television shows, newspapers, and magazines.
Their findings are printed monthly in the AFAJournal.
76
One of CLeaR-TV's most successful efforts was the highly
publicized boycott of Pepsi-Cola products, which was announced in
the AFA Journal in March, 1989.77 Wildmon was enraged by
Pepsi's "Make a Wish" television ad campaign, featuring rock singer
Madonna and the soundtrack of her simultaneously released video
"Like a Prayer," which Wildmon found "'sacrilegious to the
core.'"7 8 To the astonishment of the advertising community, Pepsi
responded to CLeaR-TV's concerns by canceling the Madonna ad
campaign, reportedly costing the company up to $10 million.
79
Wildmon explained his objections in Time magazine:
"Pepsi said to our young people in this country, 'Here is the role
model we think worthy of $10 million in support.' Here is a pop
singer who makes a video that's sacrilegious to the core. Here's
a pop star that made a low-budget porn film. Here's a pop star
who goes around in her concerts with sex oozing out, wearing a
cross. Now Pepsi is saying to all the young people of the new
generation, 'Here is the person we want you to emulate and
imitate.' They can do that. They've got every right to give
Madonna $10 million, put it on television every night if they want
to. All I'm saying is 'Don't ask me to buy Pepsi if you do it.
You've got the right to spend your money where you want to; I've
got the right to spend my money where I want to ... ' and
obviously, evidently, I was somewhat right in that because Pepsi
agreed. They canceled their commercial and their [sponsorship of
Madonna's] world tour."
80
74 Id.
75 See Cox, supra note 70, at 6B. The AFA is the reincarnated "organization of
evangelical Christians" that Wildmon originally founded as the Federation. See id.;
see also text accompanying notes 56-59.
76 See Cox, supra note 70, at 6B.
77 See Sheila Mullan, Pepsi Yanks Madonna Ads After Religious Boycotts, UPI, Apr. 6,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
78 Winbush, supra note 55, at 54 (quoting Donald Wildmon).
79 See Estelle Lander, Viewers Who Have Taken Offense at Risque Shows Go on the
Offense, NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 1989, § 2 (City Business), at 1.
80 Winbush, supra note 55, at 54-55 (quoting Donald Wildmon). It is important
to note that Wildmon's threatened boycott of Pepsi is conceptually distinguishable
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On July 17, 1989, on the heels of its recent success with Pepsi,
CLeaR-TV mounted its largest crusade, a year-long boycott of
Mennen Co. and Clorox Corp., companies which CLeaR-TV
denounced as "'the leading sponsors of sex, violence and profanity'"
on television. 8 1 This determination was based on the work of
3,000 CLeaR-TV monitors in thirty-three states from April 27,
through May 24, 1989.82 CLeaR-TV promoted the boycott by
producing a thirty-minute television program explaining the
boycott, which the group asked religious broadcasters around the
country to air free of charge. 83 To further insure the boycott's
success, the AFA committed $2 million out of its $5.2 million
annual budget to a direct-mail and ad campaign which publicized
the boycott.
84
Representatives from both Mennen and Clorox expressed
surprise upon hearing CLeaR-TV's accusations, with Clorox noting
that it followed internal standards which "precluded" its commer-
cials from being shown in "'programs that make gratuitous, overly
graphic use of sex or violence; treat ethnic, religious or political
groups in a disparaging manner; present facts inaccurately, or
glorify... drug or alcohol consumption.'" 85 Mennen, on the other
hand, issued an aggressive official statement critical of CLeaR-TV's
goals:
"The Mennen Co. has a long-standing policy of pre-screening
programs and infrequently declines to sponsor programs that do
not meet its standards .... However, it seems that opinions differ
in our great country with regard to what is appropriate viewing.
from most of his other campaigns. In protesting Pepsi's relationship with Madonna,
Wildmon was concerned with the content of the song used in the Madonna ad. His
other campaigns are usually focused on the content of the television program, not the
advertisement. The former campaign seems more ethical than the latter, as the
advertiser's role in producing the commercial is substantial, while its influence on
program content is minimal. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
81 See "New McCarthyism': Year Boycott of Mennen, Clorox Products Announced by
CLeaR-TV, COMM. DAILY,July 18, 1989, at 2 [hereinafter New McCarthyism] (quoting
statement of CLeaR-TV).
82 See id.; Two Advertisers Targeted for Boycott, BROADCASTING,July 24, 1989, at 80.
The "sweeps" period, of which the boycott period was one, occur four times annually.
During this time the networks set the advertising rates for their programs. See Rick
DuBraw, KNB, KCBS Ride War Wave with Early Newscasts, L.A. TIMES,Jan. 29, 1991,
at F9.
83 See Two Advertisers Targeted for Boycott, supra note 82, at 80.
84 See Cox, supra note 70, at 6B.
85 Two Advertisers Targeted for Boycott, supra note 82, at 80 (quoting Clorox
spokesman Fred Reicker).
BOYCOTTING OF TELEVISION ADVERTISERS
We do not believe the Mennen Co. should act as a censor for
CLeaR-TV or for any other group. We believe the viewing public
will understand the position we are taking and recognize that
opinions may differ regarding acceptable programs."
86
Eight months into the boycott, its impact was unclear. Financial
analysts generally agreed that the boycott had not hurt the bottom-
line performances of either Clorox or Mennen. 7 Wildmon dis-
agreed. "'Hard figures, independent figures are there to confirm
that,'" he said, noting that Clorox revenues and profits declined in
the second half of 1989, compared with the first six months of the
year.88 Analysts, however, attributed Clorox's second-half figures
to a normal decline in the sale of seasonal products, such as
barbecue sauces, bleach, charcoal, and salad dressings.8 9 The data
indicated that "Clorox actually performed well throughout 1989,
showing healthy gains in revenue and profit compared with
1988. "90
Three months prior to its scheduled conclusion,9 1 CLeaR-TV
lifted its boycott against Clorox, contending that the company
experienced a decrease in sales and had "'implored the group to
ease off.'"9 2 Clorox denied that the boycott affected product sales,
but claimed that its "'reputation had been unjustly sullied. ' " "
Nevertheless, a Clorox spokesperson conceded that the company (1)
ceased to advertise on the shows that CLeaR-TV found objection-
able, (2) agreed to implement standards which would prevent its
advertising on "shows depicting gratuitous sex and violence," and
(3) received about 350,000 letters supporting the boycott.94 At the
same time, Wildmon announced that the boycott of Mennen would
continue for the remaining three months.
95
86Judith Graham, AdIndusty Rears up at Boycott, ADVERTISING AGE,July 24,1989,
at 16 (quoting statement of Mennen Co.).87 SeeJames Cox, Boycott Group Might Have On-Screen Win, USA TODAY, Mar. 12,
1990, at lB.
88 See id. (quoting Donald Wildmon).
89 See id.
90 Id.
91 See Steve Weinstein, Christian TV-Watchdog Group Ends Boycott on Clorox, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1990, at Fl.
92 Laura Malt, CLeaR-TV Lif Clorox Ban, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Apr. 30, 1990, at
3 (quoting CLeaR-TV chairman Billy Melvin).
3 Id. (quoting Clorox spokesman Fred Reicker).
94 See id.
95 See Weinstein, supra note 91, at Fl.
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Several months later, on September 1, 1990, CLeaR-TV began
another national boycott,9 6 this time of Burger King's 5,400
franchises, 97 which collectively spend $215 million a year on U.S.
advertising.98 CLeaR-TV claimed to have found the fast-food
chain to be among the leading sponsors of "gratuitous sex, violence,
and anti-Christian stereotyping" on network television. 99 The
offending shows included two television weekly series (CBS's
Vietnam drama Tour of Duty and ABC's thirtysomething)1 ° ° and the
films Platoon, Octopussy, and Throw Momma from the Train.10 1 This
boycott was canceled two months later after CLeaR-TV leaders met
with company officials from Burger King.
1 0 2
As part of a settlement of complaints with the group, Burger
King ran half-page advertisements in 554 daily newspapers across
the country titled "An Open Letter to the American People":
"Burger King wishes to go on record as supporting traditional
American values on television, especially the importance of the
family. We believe the American people desire television pro-
grams that reflect the values they are trying to instill in their
children. We pledge to support such programs with our advertis-
ing dollars."
103
Burger King officials firmly denied that the boycott had any
impact on sales, stating only that the company "'wanted to make the
public aware of our position.'"104 "'We were concerned that there
were a lot of misconceptions in the minds of our consumers and
that there were hundreds of thousands of them out there who didn't
see the news release [from CLeaR-TV] calling the boycott off.'
" 10 5
96 See Anthony Ramirez, Burger King Ads Help End Boycott by Religious Group, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1990, at D1.
91 See Boycott of Burger King Called Off, CHIC, TRIB., Nov. 2, 1990, § 3 (Business),
at 2.
9 See Black, supra note 70, at 8.
99 See Ramirez, supra note 96, at Dl.
loo See Howard Rosenberg, Burger KingBows to TV Watchdogs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14,
1990, at Fl. Tour of Duty was cited for its "profane language and graphic violence,"
including "explosions and tortured, writhing bodies." Id. at F12. thirtysomething was
criticized for showing the estranged couple Elliot and Nancy together in bed after
they separated. Id.
101 See Carol U. Ozemhoya, Burger Kings Ads Responded to Group's Boycott, S. FLA.
Bus.J., Nov. 12, 1990, § 1, at 3; see also Rosenberg, supra note 100, at F12.
102 See Ozemhoya, supra note 101, at 3.
103 Id. at 3 (quoting Burger King advertisement); see Black, supra note 70, at 8
(same).
104 Ozemhoya, supra note 101, at 3 (quoting Michael Evans, media relations
manager of Burger King).
10 Rosenberg, supra note 100, at F12 (quoting Michael Evans, media relations
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More recently, CLear-TV targeted Honda Motor Corp. as the
biggest sponsor of "un-Christian sex, violence and profanity on
network television."106 Wildmon also included Duracell, US
Sprint, Sony, Anheuser-Busch, Nissan, Heinz, Chrysler and Ralston-
Purina as sponsors of objectionable programs.10 7  However,
CLeaR-TV has yet to announce a boycott of Honda products,
108
or of any other products from the eight companies listed. Neverthe-
less, Wildmon maintains that he will continue to apply economic
pressure to the advertising and broadcasting industries as long as
they "'continue to think with their wallets. '" 109 "'I've always tried
to work through their conscience,'" he claimed recently.110 "'It
just so happens that they sit on their conscience.
' "1
B. A Single Viewer's Impact on Network Sponsors
"'I'm a perfect example of the First Amendment in its best
form,'" claimed Terry Rakolta,112 a Michigan homemaker and
mother of four, who demonstrated how easily advertisers can be
influenced when a sole viewer expresses her dissatisfaction with
network television. In 1989, Rakolta initiated a campaign urging
several major corporations to discontinue advertising their products
on the highly popular Fox comedy series Married ... with Children,
which she described as "'consistently offensive. They exploit
women, they stereotype poor people, they're anti-family."
13
Since Rakolta felt that responsibility for offensive programming
manager of Burger King).
1° Claudia Puig, Morning Report: TV & Video, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1991, at F2.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 Patricia Freeman, As the "Clean TV" Campaign Heats Up, ABC Chills Two New
Shows, PEOPLE, May 22, 1989, at 155 (quoting Donald Wildmon). Shortly before
publication of this Comment, Mazda Motor of America was under attack by Wildmon
for advertising on NBC's Saturday Night Live. See Kathy Brown & Pat Hinsberg,
Mazda Ads First to Bow to Boycott, Cm. TR., Nov. 3, 1991, Business Section, at 9A.
Mazda subsequently removed its ads from the show but denied that the boycott
affected its decision. See Martha T. Moore, Mazda Yanks Ads From 'SNI," USA
TODAY, Nov. 5,1991, at 2B. Mazda, however, acknowledged that Wildmon "'brought
to [their] attention some of the potential problems with advertisements'" on the show.
See Brown & Hinsberg, supra, at 9A (quoting Mazda spokesman Jack Pitney).
110 See Freeman, supra note 109, at 155 (quoting Donald Wildmon).
111 Id.
112 What Should Be Done About Dfferent Standards in TVProgramming?, BROADCAsT-
ING, Mar. 19, 1990, at 40 (quoting Terry Rakolta).
113 Michigan Viewer Urges Ad Boycott of"Married.., with Children, "BROADCASTING,
Mar. 6, 1989, at 34 [hereinafter Michigan Viewer] (quoting Terry Rakolta).
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should rest "squarely on the shoulders of advertisers," she threat-
ened them with a boycott.114 The sponsors, in turn, pressured
the network, which responded by toning down the show and moving
it to a later time period.
115
Although the fiscal impact of her campaign on the targeted
companies was negligible, she did receive a personal written apology
from Coca-Cola USA President Ira C. Herbert for his company's
advertising on an episode featuring "a back shot of a woman taking
off her bra" and references to homosexuality that "appalled"
Rakolta. 116  However, Coca-Cola did not withdraw its ads from
the program and stated that decisions concerning placement of its
commercials would continue to be made on an "episode-by-episode
basis on all the programs it sponsors."
117
According to Fox, only Tambrands Inc. pulled its commercials
from that season's Married... with Children schedule as a result of
Rakolta's complaints. 1 8 Sandoz/Dorsey Inc. also announced its
intent to withdraw its advertising,119 as did Procter & Gamble,
Kimberly-Clark, and McDonald's.1 20 Nonetheless, at the time of
Rakolta's complaint, not only was every commercial spot on the
Married ... with Children schedule filled, but there was a long
sponsor waiting list as well.
121
Since her letter-writing campaign, Rakolta has remained active
in the media. She has formed her own advocacy group, Americans
for Responsible Television, and she recently spoke on a panel as
part of the Center for Population Options' forum on consumer-
backed sponsor pull-outs and censorship. 22 Although she has
limited her campaign against sex and violence on television to
programming shown during early "family" viewing hours, she does
114 See id.
115 See Christine Gorman, Listen Here, Mr. Big: Corporate Misbehavior is Sparking
a Fevered Outburst of Consumer Protests and Boycotts, TIME, July 3, 1989, at 41; David
Kalish, Marriage... With Problems: Advertising on "Married... With Children" Creative
Concepts, MARKETING & MEDIA DECIsIONs, May 1990, at 30.
116 See Michigan Viewer, supra note 113, at 34.
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See Kalish, supra note 115, at 30.
120 See Michigan Viewer, supra note 113, at 34.
121 See id. Many of the companies currently advertising on the show are among
the top 25 advertisers, including Budweiser, Burger King, Coors, Gillette, LA Gear,
Mitsubishi, Nintendo, Nissan, Subaru, and the U.S. Army. See Kalish, supra note 115,
at 30.
122 See Diane Haithman, Housewife Critic of TVFinds Less to Protest, L.A. TIMEs,July
22, 1989, § 5, at 1.
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not believe that her group is encouraging censorship.1 23 "'What
we're saying is, self-regulate-you know the boundaries. We're not
in the line-drawing business. You draw the line.'" 124  Further-
more, Rakolta has begun a formal survey of the nation's 100 leading
advertisers to determine what standards they employ in choosing
programs on which to advertise.1 25 "If a company without a
formal policy on program content rejects her group's advice to
formulate one, ... it will become a candidate for a product
boycott."126 "'Advertisers have a choice to advertise on any show
they want, but consumers also have a choice not to buy the products
of that advertiser,'" she recently explained in Advertising Age, "'[i]t's
our only leverage.
' " 127
C. People For The American Way and the Battle Against Censorship
While the efforts of CleaR-TV and Americans for Responsible
Television serve to limit television viewing choices, other organiza-
tions are devoted to promoting free speech and viewing options.
People for the American Way, for example, has taken up the battle
against censorship as part of its commitment to protecting First
Amendment values.1 28 Formed in 1980 by television producer
Norman Lear, creator of such controversial television shows as All
in the Family, Maude, and Sanford and Son, People for the American
Way has been guided by a number of advisers from the business and
religious communities, including Norman Cousins, the former
editor of The Saturday Review, Reverend M. William Howard, past
123 See id.
124 Id. (quoting Terry Rakolta).
125 SeeJudith Graham & Steven W. Colford, Execs Fret as Program Jitters Kill ABC
Shows, ADVERTISING AGE, May 8, 1989, at 3.
126 Id.
127 Id. (quoting Terry Rakolta).
128 See Steve Weinstein, Religious Right May Be in for a Fight, L.A. TIMES, May 20,
1991, at Fl. Although much of the organization's energies have been directed
recently towards countering various consumer boycotts, People for the American Way
has been active on a number of other constitutional fronts. For example, the group
recently published its annual study of school censorship, which documented a 33%
rise in the number of challenges to school materials. SeeJennifer Warren, Schools Face
Censor's Siege Group Says, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1991, at A3. In addition, the group
has criticized Blockbuster Video's recent decision not to carry videotapes rated NC-17
in its stores, which number 1,600 nationwide. See Beth Kleid, MorningReport: Movies,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1991, at F2. Finally, the group, critical of the Supreme Court's
recent abortion rulings, lobbied actively to support the Freedom of Choice Act. See
Greg Downs, State Lawmakers Ask Congress: Block Right to Limit Abortion, GANNETr
NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 7, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
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president of the National Council of Churches, and Edgar M.
Bronfman, chairman of Joseph E. Seagram and Sons Inc.
129
The efforts of People for the American Way, for the most part,
have been reactive rather than aggressive. For example, when the
Coalition for Better Television began its campaign in 1981, People
for the American Way allocated $3 million for television and radio
advertisements to "'promote freedom of thought and expres-
sion ' "1 30 and sent public service announcements to television
stations around the country to denounce the boycotts.1 31 These
efforts, however, appeared to have little impact on the advertising
community, as several major advertisers met with Coalition leaders
in an attempt to "avert" the threatened boycott. 3 2 Eight years
later, when Wildmon's American Family Association initiated a
sponsor boycott of the drama Roe v. Wade, People for the American
Way held a news conference to reiterate their opposition to the
attempts of advocacy groups to influence programming.
3 3
Arthur Kropp, the organization's president, charged that Wildmon
was "'trying to turn network TV into a bully pulpit for his own
narrow political and theological viewpoints.'" 134 Likewise, in
response to CLeaR-TV's boycott of Clorox and Mennen, Kropp
observed:
"My advice is to ignore Don Wildmon.... He finds anti[-]family
or and-Christian conspiracies in such programs as ALF, Growing
Pains and The Magic World of Disney. Don Wildmon is obviously
way out in left field, way out of step with the tastes of the
American public. He relies on intimidation tactics that can only
win if people take him seriously. Past Wildmon boycotts have
failed miserably at the checkout counter and I expect this latest
effort will fail as well." 3 5
Despite its public stance against groups such as CLeaR-TV,
People for the American Way appears to have been far less
influential in affecting network programming than its conservative
129 See These Liberal Groups Are Keeping the Voters on Their Toes, 13 NAT'LJ. 1200
(1981).
13 0 Id. (quoting Anthony Podesta, executive director of People for the American
Way).
131 See Lear TVAds to Oppose the Moral Majority, N.Y. TIMES,June 25, 1981, at C14.
132 See Joseph B. Treaster, TV Advertisers Meet Coalition in Effort to Avert Boycott,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1981, at A10; see also supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
133 Don Kowet, The "Righteous Indignation of Donald Wildmon: How a Mississippi
Minister Terrorizes the TV Networks, WASH. TIMES, July 12, 1989, at El.
"s4 Id. (quoting Arthur Kropp).
13 5 New McCarthyism, supra note 81, at 2 (quoting Arthur Kropp).
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counterparts. This lack of influence may reflect the fact that it is
more difficult to criticize a company for not advertising on a show
than for sponsoring one. Indeed, organizations like People for the
American Way have a hard time simply identifying those advertisers
that withdraw from controversial programs, as the networks are
reluctant to publish the names of such corporations.136 Of all the
organizations that attempt to effect change in network television,
conservative groups, such as CLeaR-TV, appear to wield the most
influence with advertisers.
Ill. THE EFFECTS OF CONSUMER BOYCOTTS ON THE PRESENTATION
OF CONTROVERSIAL PROGRAMMING
The programs and messages conveyed on television are unique;
they invade the home, a traditional sanctuary. The challenge in
developing acceptable network programming, however, lies in the
recognition that the program welcomed into the home of one may
offend another. A lighthearted comment from an industry insider
illustrates the paradox:
"Dental groups howl when a TV character expresses dread of the
dentist's chair .... Bankers and securities dealers don't like it
when one is depicted as a crook or embezzler .... Librarians'
organizations write bitter little notes about the stereotypes of the
librarian ... and the wine industry became upset when it was
implied that muscatel was the beverage most favored by broken-
down alcoholics .... Sometimes I think there are too many
minorities ... and I'm not talking about race, creed, or color, or
land of origin. I mean doctors, lawyers, plumbers, storekeepers
and milliners. And all of them are very easily offended."I 7
Causing the most controversy are issues for which there is no
clear moral consensus, such as abortion, homosexuality, and the
environment. Advocacy groups are especially concerned when these
issues are included in, or excluded from, network programming.
This Section examines the treatment of these subjects on network
television and the corresponding reactions from various advocacy
groups.
136 See Diane Mermigas, 'Roe' Loses Ads: NBC Stands Firm, ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
May 15, 1989, at 3; infra notes 156-66, 195-206 and accompanying text.
137 MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 19-20 (quoting Cynthia Lowry, TV Censor's Job:
Listening to All Those Complaints, Associated Press column, Aug. 22, 1961).
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A. Abortion: When Balanced Viewpoints Aren't "Balanced" Enough
Controversy surrounding abortion themes in television programs
dates back to CBS' Maude in 1972, and has resurfaced in recent
years on such shows as China Beach, and the made-for-television
movie Roe v. Wade. In an attempt to avoid offending viewers and
advertisers, many programs dealing with abortion seek to take a
neutral position, by presenting someone in support of abortion
rights as well as someone in opposition.1l8 Nevertheless, in a
society where abortion rights are constantly debated, there are many
who prefer that the subject be removed completely from the
television airwaves.
1. Maude Enrages Catholic Pro-Life Organizations
8 9
In 1972, a two-part Maude episode caused an uproar when the
title character, a strong-willed, liberated, middle-aged, married
woman played by Bea Arthur, became pregnant and, fearing the
health risks associated with later-life deliveries, decided to have an
abortion. 140 Immediately after the broadcast, 373 angry viewers
bombarded the CBS switchboard in New York with calls; only ten
viewers registered favorable reactions. 141 The network also re-
ceived hundreds of letters from people upset with the telecast,
claiming that the program espoused abortion and that "it was
inappropriate to treat such a serious subject as abortion in a comedy
series, especially in a show broadcast at 8:00 p.m., when many
children would be watching." 142 The producers maintained that
the show was balanced, since it included a peripheral character, a
mother of four who accidentally became pregnant and was "ecstatic
about her condition," sharply contrasting with Maude's "distressed
state of mind." 14 The character, however, did not discuss the
issue of abortion, but "was merely added as a kind of sidebar to the
138 See infra text accompanying notes 167-70.
139 For a thorough discussion of the abortion controversy in Maude, see
MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 27-50.140 See Jay Sharbutt, NBC Chief Urges Advertisers to Support 'Roe,'L.A. TIMES, May
11, 1989, § 6, at 1.
141 See Aljean Harmetz, Maude Didn't Leave "em All Laughing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
1972, at B3.
142 MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 34.
143 Id. at 32.
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central story line, and a very minor one at that. Needless to say, her
presence did little to prevent the show from attack." 144
Although the ratings for the two episodes averaged an impres-
sive forty-one percent share of the audience, 145 Maude's produc-
ers did not expect "the extent of the outcry over Maude's abor-
tion." 146 Pro-life organizations, many of them affiliated with the
Catholic Church, vehemently protested the show and called for a
boycott of its sponsors.1 47 In a complaint to the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC), the groups alleged a violation of the
Fairness Doctrine. 148 In keeping with its decisions concerning
144 Id. at 33.
145 See Sharbutt, supra note 140, at 1.
146 MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 34. For example, Lear said that "'[m]y fight is
to get a funny script on a subject that is adult and meaningful. I enjoy stirring
feelings, even negative feelings, because I think that is what theater is about. It's
marvelous to know you have engaged the feelings of millions of people.'" Harmetz,
supra note 141, at 23 (quoting Norman Lear).
147 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 35-38.
148 The Fairness Doctrine was a policy designed to promote the balanced
presentation of controversial issues. It required radio and television broadcasters that
presented one viewpoint on a controversial issue to present or provide time for the
conflicting view. See FCC Does Not Plan to Eliminate Fairness Doctrine Fowler Says,
DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Apr. 8, 1987, at A5. Broadcasters claimed that the
doctrine infringed upon their First Amendment rights and restricted their
"journalistic freedom." Id. Some argued that the doctrine stifled freedom of
expression because broadcasters feared that examining controversial topics would
incite opponents to file FCC complaints. See id. In August 1987, the FCC abolished
the doctrine, claiming that it "no longer served the public interest." MONTGOMERY,
supra note 7, at 220; see In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043,
5057 (1987). In doing so, the FCC found that "dramatic technological advances" had
eased concerns about spectrum scarcity. See PTAR Challenged at FCC, BROADCASTING,
Apr. 23, 1990, at 89. This prompted an unsuccessful attempt by legislators to codify
the policy as an amendment to a spending bill in late 1987. See Dennis McDougal &
Karen Tumulty, Fairness Doctrine Loses, But Issue Due to Resurface in 1988, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1987, § 6, at 1. An equally unsuccessful lawsuit challenged the FCC's
decision. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding that "the FCC's decision that the Fairness Doctrine no longer served the
public interest was neither arbitrary nor capricious"). Ironically, several commenta-
tors, including Ralph Nader, claim that the doctrine's elimination has actually
decreased the amount of public affairs programming on television. See Public Affairs
Shows Decline 51%, Nader Says, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1989, at A3 (reporting results of
a public interest group founded by Nader); see also Doug Halonen, The Vanishing
Editorialist, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Sept. 24, 1990, at front cover (claiming a decline in
the number of local television general manager editorials). The Fairness Doctrine,
however, continues to apply to cable stations. See Preemptive Strike: Mooney Says Cable
Has More Public Interest Obligations Than Stations, COMM. DAILY, June 26, 1991, at 2;
John Wolfe, NCTA Blasts Broadcasters 'Duplicitious' Campaign to Use Regulation to Stfle
Cable Competition, U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
USNWR File.
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public affairs programming, the FCC denied the complaint, finding
that the pro-life groups had not succeeded in showing that CBS had
failed to present adequately their position in any of its broad-
casts. 149 Although the FCC ruled that a network entertainment
program did not have to address both sides of a controversial issue,
it did indicate that the FCC would extend the Fairness Doctrine to
entertainment programming, in addition to news and public affairs
broadcasts.
1 50
Meanwhile, the Catholic press continued to urge the nation's 48
million Catholics to write letters and boycott the eight corporate
sponsors of the episodes.1 51 To undercut these efforts, pro-
choice activists wrote letters expressing their support to these same
sponsors. 15 2  As the intensity of the campaigns declined, the
boycott threats soon dissipated.1 53 The boycotts, however, had an
effect on advertiser sponsorship of the program. When the network
repeated the program for a second showing during the following
summer, only thirty seconds (out of three available minutes) of
commercial time in the two episodes was purchased. 154  Pepsi-
Cola, Co., in fact, directly attributed its withdrawal to consumer
displeasure with the show and the boycott threats. A spokesperson
explained: "'Our policy is essentially hands-off in terms of any sort
of prescreening or prejudgment.... [B]ut after the protests.., the
company felt it'd be best to bow out of the repeats rather than
antagonize all those people all over again.
'"155
2. Ten Advertisers Withdraw Commercials From Roe v. Wade
Almost seventeen years after the Maude controversy, and the
Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade,15 6 NBC made a television movie
of the same name. Prior to the movie's May 15, 1989, broadcast,
149 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 42.
150 See id.
151 See id. at 37.
152 See id. at 38.
155 See id. at 39.
154 See Albin Krebs, "Maude" Sponsorship Decline Laid to Abortion Foes, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1973, at 61.
155 MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 46 (quoting a Pepsi spokesperson). The
reluctance of advertisers, such as Pepsi, to support the rebroadcast may have grown
out of a desire to appease people like Bishop James S. Rausch, the former general
secretary of the U.S. Catholic Conference, who labelled CBS's decision to rebroadcast
the abortion episode "'a breach of good faith.'" Krebs, supra note 154, at 61.
156 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Donald Wildmon's American Family Association sent letters to five
hundred national television advertisers urging them not to sponsor
the program.1 57  The AFA also urged viewers to boycott any
company's products that were advertised during the movie.158 In
response to Wildmon's efforts, and in fear of losing advertiser
support for the show, NBC President Robert C. Wright made an
extraordinary move-publicly sending letters to numerous presidents
of major corporations. 159 Concerned with the threatened boy-
cotts, Wright stated that the program was "'balanced, thoughtful
and compelling, and deserving of strong advertiser support ....
NBC firmly believes the decision about where your messages appear
rests with you and your marketing people-not with those who have
a predisposition to judge a program's merits based on their own
agenda and no information.'"
160
Despite his efforts, at least ten sponsors, whom NBC declined to
identify, withdrew their commercials from the film. 161  Each of
the twenty-eight thirty-second commercial spots was sold, although
many for less than their usual rate of $180,000 per thirty-second
period. 162  Advertising executives estimated that last-minute
advertisers received discounts as high as fifty percent.16  After
the program aired, NBC reported that its switchboard registered
394 telephone calls in favor of the film and seventy-seven calls in
protest.164 The controversy drew sufficient attention to make the
movie the highest rated program that evening, attracting a twenty-
seven percent share of the audience. 165  The movie also won
accolades from the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences; Holly
Hunter won an Emmy award for best actress in a mini-series or
special and the movie shared the award for best drama-comedy
special.
166
157 See Diane Mermigas, "Roe" Loses Ads: NBC Stands Firm, ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
May 15, 1989, at 3.
15 8 See Wright Defends 'Roe' to Advertisers, BROADCASTING, May 15, 1989, at 31.
159 See id.
160 Id. (quoting letter of Robert C. Wright).
161 See Sharbutt, supra note 140, at 1.
162 SeeJeremy Gerard, TV Notes, N.Y. TIMEs, May 18, 1989, at C30.
163 See id.
164 SeeJay Sharbutt, "Roe vs. Wade" Courts Smaller Audience But Still Wins Ratings,
L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1989, § 6, at 1.
165 See Gerard, supra note 162, at C30.
166 See Emmy Awards for 'Roe v. Wade' and 'Day One,'N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1989,
at C20.
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3. China Beach Costs ABC $780,000 in Lost
Advertising Revenue
Unlike the cases of Maude and Roe v. Wade, advocacy groups are
often unaware that an abortion issue will be presented in a program
before it airs. In such a situation, it is likely that the groups will
seek to prevent the network from scheduling a second broadcast.
Such was the case with China Beach, the Emmy award-winning ABC
drama set in Vietnam. In the January 31, 1990, episode entitled
"Holly's Choice," the show portrayed the experience of one
character who underwent an abortion.167 Although China Beach
protagonist Colleen McMurphy expressed her own opposition to
abortion, the episode appeared neutral. 168 After airing the epi-
sode, ABC announced that the program cost the network $780,000
because several advertisers, fearful of consumer reaction, decided
to withdraw their commercials from the program.169 Mindful of
these lost revenues, and of adverse viewer reaction, the network
decided not to rebroadcast the episode during the summer
months.
170
Maude, Roe v. Wade, and China Beach are three examples of
network programming addressing abortion issues. They highlight
two troubling aspects of consumer boycotts in an advertising-based
television industry. First, a tension exists between a network's
desire to attract large audiences with topical programming and a
simultaneous fear that excessive controversy will reduce advertiser
sponsorship. Although the financial impact of a boycott may be
negligible, advertisers "wish to avoid subsequent negative publicity
and the possibility of offending loyal customers."171 If abortion-
related programs continue to be a source of lost advertising revenue
for the networks, such shows may be eliminated, thereby diminish-
ing the exchange of ideas on the subject. Second, and more
troubling, are advertisers' preemptive decisions to avoid sponsoring
programs concerning abortion issues before they are aired. These
actions prevent the programs from reaching their intended
167 See Howard Rosenberg, Advertisers Cooling Offto Hot Topics, L.A. TIMEs,July 26,
1990, at Fl.
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 Donald P. Hill & Andrea L. Beaver, Advocacy Groups and Television Advertisers,
20J. ADVERTISING 18, 19 (1991).
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audience, denying the viewer the opportunity to form her own
opinion.
B. Homosexuality: Still Controversial Two Decades After
the Dawning of the Gay Rights Movement
"'The networks have been openly and unabashedly portraying
homosexuals in a positive light. They are blatantly promoting anti-
Christian values.'" 172 This accusation was made by the AFA's
associate director, Bill Swindell, in response to the increased
visibility of gays in network television programming.173 Ever since
the 1969 Stonewall riot in Greenwich Village sparked the gay rights
movement, the networks have struggled with the depiction of
homosexuals on prime-time television. 174 Most often, the net-
works have ignored the issue. This neglect of homosexuality-related
programming prompted a director of the National Gay Task Force
(NGTF) to comment: "'Homosexuals have been invisible in the
media. We are 10 per cent of the U.S. population but to listen to
television or radio, you hardly know we exist .... When we have
been part of programs, we are shown as the effeminate stereo-
types.'"
175
Nevertheless, while Maude was causing a controversy about
abortion, 176 the 1972 ABC made-for-television movie That Certain
Summer broke ground with its sensitive and serious prime-time
portrayal of a homosexual couple. 177 The film depicted the trou-
bled relationship between a gay, upper-middle class, divorced father
and his teenage son. The father, played by Hal Holbrook, struggles
to tell his son that he is gay and living with a lover, played by Martin
Sheen. 178 At the end of the film, the father "cries and apologizes
to the son,"179 who is unable to accept his father's lifestyle.
180
172 Joseph Hanania, Gay and Under Pressure, NEWSDAY, Nov. 8, 1989, § II, at 7
(quoting Bill Swindell, associate director of AFA).
173 See id.
174 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 77.
175 Marsha Dubrow, REUTERS, Mar. 13, 1980, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuter File (quoting Charles Brydon, co-executive director of the National Gay Task
Force).176 See John J. O'Connor, Yesterday's Taboos Are Taken for Granted Now, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1982, § 2, at 27.
177 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 75-79.
178 See Lee Margulies, 'ConsentingAdult'as Gay Son, L.A. TIMES,Jan. 31, 1985, § 6,
at 1.
179 Id.
'80 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 75.
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The movie's courageous and unstereotypical portrayal of homosexu-
ality was critically acclaimed for its treatment of the subject
matter.1 8 1 The film also did well in the ratings, leading the
network to believe that television shows exploring homosexuality
would attract large television audiences and, in turn, encourage
advertiser sponsorship.1 8 2 The case studies below illustrate the
often conflicting ways that homosexuality is depicted by the medium
and the divergent viewer reactions provoked by these portrayals.
The controversies reflect the ongoing conflict between conservative
and religious groups seeking to prevent this programming and gay
activists seeking greater access.
1. Gay Activists' Outrage Over Marcus Welby, M.D.
In 1974, a time when television "almost invariably portrayed
[homosexuals] as sick,"183 the ABC drama Marcus Welby, M.D.
angered the gay community.1 84 Entitled "The Outrage," the
episode featured a male science teacher accused of molesting one
of his teenage male students.185  The gay community saw this
connection of homosexuality to child molestation as an example of
the inaccurate gay-related images they fought to eliminate from the
mass media, for it threatened "not only to reinforce anti-gay
sentiment but to create it as well." 18 6  Upon discovering the
program's content during a pre-broadcast screening of the
show,187 gay activists persuaded seventeen ABC affiliates not to
broadcast the episode.18 8  After determining which advertisers
had purchased time in the upcoming episode, the NGTF published
181 See id.
182 The film, though controversial, did not appear to generate the same kid of
advertiser resistance seen today. See The Age of Archie: 1970s, PEOPLE, Summer 1989,
at 116.
183 Harry F. Waters, Sex and TV, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 20, 1978, at 54.
184 For a discussion of the controversy surrounding Marcus Welby, M.D., see
MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 79-89.
185 See id. at 80; see also TV Sex and Violence - Showdown Nears in Washington, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP.,June 13, 1975, at 31.
186 MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 80.
187 See Dubrow, supra note 175.
'88 See Gays Form Most Effective TV Lobby, Magazine Says, UPI, May 26, 1981,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File [hereinafter Gays Form Lobby] (referring
to an article published in TV Guide); Harry F. Waters, TV: Do Minorities Rule?,
NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1975, at 78.
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those sponsors' names and instructed its members to write protest
letters to them, threatening a product boycott.
18 9
Not content with the progress made through the television and
advertising industries, the NGTF convinced the American Psychiat-
ric Association, which had recently removed homosexuality from its
list of mental illnesses, to "issue a public statement condemning the
... episode." 190  As a result of the activists' campaign, seven
companies withdrew their commercials from the program, leaving
only one minute of commercial time sold. 191  The network,
however, aired the episode, which resulted in several individual
stations becoming the subject of protests. In Washington, D.C., for
example, WMAL was picketed by twenty-five members of the Gay
Activist Alliance and two women from NOW.192 The groups
demanded an apology from the station for showing a program that
"projected a negative view of homosexuals and pandered to the
mythology that homosexuals are child molesters. 193  Having
already lost money on the program, ABC decided not to rebroadcast
the episode during the summer season.
194
2. ABC Loses Over $2 Million in Advertising Revenue in
Broadcasts of Two thirtysomething Episodes
Executive producer Marshall Herskovitz described thirtysomething
as based on the belief "'that human beings must struggle and
educate themselves and ask fundamental questions which will lead
to the understanding of the world we live in. It is the belief that
there is something inherently worthwhile in trying to discover the
totality and complexity of the human experience .... '"195 The
series featured two married upscale couples in their thirties, along
with their friends and relatives and intermittently included a
positive portrayal of a homosexual artist, Russell. In a 1989
episode, Melissa, one of the main characters, introduced Russell to
another young homosexual.1 96 They became romantically in-
's9 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 82.
190 Id.
191 See id. at 83.
192 See Protest Picket at WMAL, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1974, at B14.
193 Id. The station reported approximately 100 telephone complaints after the
broadcast. See id.
194 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 85.
195 Hanania, supra note 172, at 9 (quoting Marshal Herskovitz).
196 See Geraldine Fabrikant, Ads Reportedly Lost Because of Gay Scene, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1989, at D21.
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volved, and were later shown in bed together.1 97 Several advertis-
ers withdrew their commercials from the episode, costing the
network approximately $1.5 million dollars in lost revenue. 198 As
with China Beach and Roe v. Wade, the departing advertisers were
not identified. 199 It was also reported that the network received
approximately four hundred phone calls after the show; roughly
ninety percent of these were negative. 200  Donald Wildmon
claimed that a mass mailing to advertisers by the AFA caused the
sponsors to cancel their ads from the thirtysomething episode.
20 1
"'Feedback from advertisers and people inside the network led us
to believe our letter had some impact,'" he claimed. 20 2 ABC
acknowledged that economic factors motivated its decision not to
rebroadcast the thirtysomething episode during summer reruns.
203
Nevertheless, just over a year after the original controversial
episode was shown, ABC unexpectedly aired a new episode
depicting the two gay men as guests at a New Year's Eve party
attended by nearly all of the show's regular characters.20 4 Al-
though the two gay men were not the episode's central focus, they
discussed their previous one-night stand during the course of the
party and "reconciled with a midnight kiss on the cheek."
205
Once again, due to commercial withdrawals, ABC lost more than
$500,000 by airing this episode.
20 6
3. Conservative Groups Preemptively Respond to Network
Interest in Secret Passions
Secret Passions, a soap opera providing a candid look at gay life,
premiered in January 1990 on community-access cable channels
throughout the country, including channels in Chicago, Cincinnati,
Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Nashville, New York, and San
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See id.
202 Id. (quoting Donald Wildmon).
203 See id.
204 See Steven Weinstein, When Gay Means Loss of Revenue, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 22,
1990, at Fl.
205 Id.
206 See id.
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Francisco.207 As of mid-1990, the show could be seen on thirty-
nine community access channels. 20 8 By network television stan-
dards, the program broke "precedent by showing men kissing,
giving each other back massages and lying in bed together after
engaging in sexual relations." 20 9 Seventeen of the show's twenty-
seven characters are homosexuals.
210
Upon hearing that the producer of the show had approached
network officials to discuss the prospect of airing the show during
prime-time, a conservative advocacy group launched a "preemptive
strike" at network executives. 2 11 Concerned Women for America
(CWA), which claimed to have 700,000 members, denounced the
show.2 12 In May 1990, CWA sent the first 600,000 of what was to
become five million mock mailgrams, warning that shows like Secret
Passions would cram "prime-time perversion ... down the throats
of decent Americans who support traditional family values."
2 13
Recipients of CWA's mailings were asked to sign postcards
addressed to officials at ABC, CBS, and NBC that promised a
boycott of any products advertised on Secret Passions, should it be
shown by one of the networks. 214 CWA's communications direc-
tor warned that the soap opera "'would break down any previous
barriers that we've had in America [against] portraying, especially
to our children, that this lifestyle, hey, it's normal, it's on TV, they
do it, they're fine, they're movie stars.
' " 215
Donald Wildmon's AFA also threatened a boycott of any
sponsors who would advertise on the show.216 Randall Murphree,
editor of the AFAJournal, commented: "'It appears to be a series
that will promote homosexuality as a normal and viable and
acceptable alternative lifestyle. ' " 217 Although as of July 1990, the
show continued to be shown on cable access stations across the
207 See James T. Jones IV, Daytime Soaps Come Out of the Closet, GANNETT NEWS
SERVICE, Jan. 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.218 See David Klinghoffer, Keep Gay Soap Opera in Close, Conservatives Warn TV
Networks, WASH. TIMES, May 25, 1990, at Al.209 Id.
210 See id.
211 See id.
212 See id.
213 Id.
214 See Leah Garchik, Personals, S. F. CHRON.,July 2, 1990, at A8.
215 Klinghoffer, supra note 208, at Al (quoting Rebecca Hagel, communications
director of CWA).
216 See id.
217 See id. (quoting Randall Murphree).
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country,2 18 there has been no indication that any of the major
networks have decided to add the show to their programming
schedules.
2 19
The controversies concerning Marcus Welby, M.D., thirtysomething,
and Secret Passions illustrate the range of reactions to the broadcast
of homosexual themes on network television. Although pleased that
Marcus Welby, M.D. addressed homosexuality, gay activists were
nonetheless angered by the implications of the program's portrayal
and the likely misconceptions of the viewing audience. On the
other hand, Secret Passions and thirtysomething demonstrate how
conservative groups are able to pressure the industry to avoid any
positive presentation of homosexuality altogether. This tension
between viewpoints has created an impossible situation for the
networks, because it is difficult to present a positive portrayal of
homosexuality when so many advocacy organizations are vehemently
opposed to the depiction. As one producer commented, "'You
won't find too many homosexual murderers on television these
days. But you don't find too many gay doctors or lawyers, either.
A lot of people have said, "To hell with the whole issue."'" 220 As
with the abortion controversy, the result of this tension is the
elimination of a topic from television's exchange of ideas and an
incomplete representation of the diverse viewpoints which exist in
society.
C. Environmental Causes Do Not Always Gain Universal Support
Although it appears that most Americans would support
measures to protect the environment, when environmental reform
poses an economic threat to an industry, such as timber, "green"
television programs become controversial. Such was the case when
Ancient Forests: Rage Over Trees, produced by The National Audubon
Society (Audubon), first aired on Turner Broadcasting System (TBS)
on September 24, 1989. Narrated by actor Paul Newman, the docu-
mentary examined the controversy between conservationists and
218 See Garchik, supra note 214, at A8.
219 This result may be attributable to other factors affecting program selection,
although it is likely that protests of Secret Passions were a significant factor.
220 Gays Form Most Effective TVLobby, Magazine Says, supra note 188 (quotingDavid
Gerber). But see Peter Johnson, Alternative Sexual Issues in Prime-Time Stoiyline, USA
TODAY,July 30, 1991, Life Section, at 30 (noting that two NBC shows, DearJohn and
L.A. Law, were planning to address homosexuality and bisexuality in upcoming
episodes).
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timber interests in the American Northwest over the future of the
nation's remaining uncut forests.221 The program was one in a
series of World of Audubon specials about environmental issues
produced by Audubon and broadcast nationwide on TBS. Covering
such topics as endangered species and alternative farming tech-
niques, these shows have had a noticeable impact on the public. A
TBS documentary on the threat to dolphins from commercial tuna
fishing, for example, prompted a large number of concerned
viewers to call the show's hotline. 222 In response to the public
outcry, most major tuna producers announced a change in their
fishing methods to protect the dolphins.
223
Unlike many environmental programs, Ancient Forests: Rage Over
Trees attracted much media attention before its broadcast. The
timber industry organized a letter-writing campaign and threatened
a boycott of a principal sponsor, Stroh Brewery Co. (Stroh), to
prevent TBS from airing the show.224 Although Stroh provided
funding and commercials for previous Audubon specials, it
withdrew its corporate sponsorship from Ancient Forests.225 The
remaining advertisers followed suit.226  Surprisingly, TBS re-
mained committed to airing the program and televised it four
times.227 In what appears to be an industry practice, TBS did not
disclose either the names of the companies that withdrew their
commercials or the amount of lost advertising revenue.
228
Audubon claimed that the campaign by the timber interests
began without their having seen the documentary. National
Audubon President Peter A. Berle commented:
"The timber industry's cowardly and ignorant attempt to withhold
a fair and well-made program from the American people has failed
221 See Stroh May Pull Financing of Audubon TVSpecials, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1989,
at C18.
222 See Carol Matlack, An Audubon Aide is Taking to the Air, 22 NAT'L J. 1550
(1990).
223 See id.
224 See Advertisers Drop Program About the Timber Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
1989, § 1, at 32.225 See Walter Goodman, More Than Spotted Owls is Endangered, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
12, 1990, § 2, at 27.226 See Logging Industry Pressures Audubon Television Specials to Cancel PBS Segment
on Ancient Forests Airing Sunday, Aug. 12, 1990, PR NEwswIRE, Aug. 9, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
227 See id.
228 See Ads Pulled From Audubon Documentary Under Timber Pressure, UPI, Sept. 22,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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outright. Nothing about the show will change. Its content
remains uncompromised and it will follow the normal schedule for
a World of Audubon Special.... This failed attempt at issue-
specific censorship is especially shocking at a time when a rising
tide of environmentalism is sweeping the nation and the television-
watching public is demanding wider coverage of crucial conserva-
tion issues. The industry campaign against this documentary is the
latest manifestation of the industry's multi-million dollar effort to
open up as much of the Northwest's public forests as possible to
unsustainable logging."
229
Although the show was broadcast, the timber industry's
successful boycott sent a clear signal to the television industry that
controversial programming may have to be shown without commer-
cial support. Profit-centered networks may be reluctant to produce
similar programs in the future, resulting in a medium without
controversial environmental programming.
D. Controversies in Other Media Outlets
Although the majority of boycott activity is geared toward
objectionable television programming, the print and radio media
have also been affected by concerted advocacy protests. The cases
below describe the consumer boycotts of two national periodicals,
Sassy and Esquire.
1. The Moral Majority's Campaign Against Sassy Magazine
Sassy, a monthly magazine for teenagers, debuted in March 1988,
under the direction of then twenty-five year old editor Jane Pratt.
In its first year of publication, Sassy featured such articles as "So
You Think You're Ready For Sex? Read This First," "The Truth
About Boys' Bodies," and "How to Kiss." 230 Sassy also candidly
tackled a broad range of controversial topics, including suicide,
homosexuality, and birth control.23 1 In early 1988, two Indiana
women successfully lobbied to remove Sassy from local supermarket
and convenience store newsstands.23 2 Their efforts captured the
229 National Audubon Society Special on Ancient Forests to Premiere Sunday, Sept. 24,
on Turner Broadcast, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 21, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File (quoting Peter A. Berle).
230 See Boycotts: Ttying to Silence Sassy, TIME, Sept. 19, 1988, at 45 [hereinafter
Silence Sassy]; Marilyn Gardner, Controversial Magazine for Teen-Age Girls Hits Sensitive
Subjects, CQusTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 7, 1988, at 23.
21 See Silence Sassy, supra note 230, at 45.
232 See Paul Frichtl, Sassy Takes on the Moral Majority; Protests Lead to Ad Pullouts,
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attention of the Moral Majority, which, in its "Liberty Report"
newsletter, urged readers to write to Sassy's advertisers and demand
that they boycott the magazine.
233
The Moral Majority's campaign had a significant impact on the
magazine's advertising revenue. Levi Strauss, Noxell, Schering-
Plough, and Tambrands suspended their advertising in Sassy for the
remainder of the year.2 34 The companies insisted that they were
not responding to pressure from the Moral Majority, though they
admitted to receiving some protest letters.235 To counteract the
negative publicity from the cancellations, Sandra Yates, president of
Matilda Publications, which published Sassy at the time, announced
that contracts from ten new advertisers had "virtually replaced" the
revenue lost from the dropped accounts. 236 This new business
was attributed to Sassy's strong readership of 500,000.237 The
Moral Majority's campaign appears to have been influential,
however. The November 1988, issue of Sassy carried only thirty
pages of advertising, six fewer than projected.
238
More important was the Moral Majority's temporary impact on
the scheduling of articles in the magazine. After the advertiser
cancellations, Sassy moved the publication of a sex education piece
with a different message, "Why Virgins Are Cool," from the
December 1988 issue to the November 1988 issue.23 9  Yates
asserted, however, that no additional editorial changes accompanied
the scheduling change. "'We have a responsibility to our readers,'"
she stated, indicating that "'virtually all teen magazines run sex
education pieces. ' "24 ' In the December 1991 issue, for example,
along with health, beauty, entertainment, and celebrity features,
were stories about the violent actions of skinheads, and suggestions
for how to fight sexism. 241 Thus, although the boycott had some
But Sassy Doesn't Flinch, FOLIO, Nov. 1988, at 66.
233 See id.
234 See id.; Silence Sassy, supra note 230, at 45.
235 Tambrands, for instance, received fewer than 20 letters but stopped advertising
in Sassy. Levi Strauss stopped advertising after receiving 50 letters. See Frichtl, supra
note 232, at 66.
236 See Silence Sassy, supra note 230, at 45.
257 See id.
238 See Frichtl, supra note 232, at 66.
239 See id.
24 0 Id. (quoting Sandra Yates).
241 SeeJodie Hargus, How to Fight Sexism, SASSY, Dec. 1991, at 60; Sarah Wood,
These Skinheads Aren't Raust, SASSY, Dec. 1991, at 51.
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effect on the publication, it is unclear what effect it had on Sassy's
long-term editorial policies.
2. Esquire Magazine and "The Secret Life of the American Wife"
Esquire is a magazine targeted to educated, upscale men. It
attracted the attention of thousands of women, however, when the
National Organization of Women (NOW) and the Feminist Majority
initiated an advertiser and reader boycott of theJune 1990 issue, in
protest of its theme, "The Secret Life of the American Wife."
242
One of the more controversial articles, "Your Wife: An Owner's
Manual," discussed "the contents of a typical handbag, the physics
of bra design, . . . and the names and relative positions of the
various parts of a woman's reproductive system," 243 complete with
a sketch of her "plumbing."244 Also contained in the issue was
"a nostalgic paean" to "The Last Housewife in America" which
included a picture of the smiling housewife "the endangered
species" cleaning a toilet.
245
"'We find it to be literally an expression of the degradation of
women, ' "246 said Tammy Bruce, president of the Los Angeles
chapter of NOW.247  "'It puts us into a subhuman level.... It
places women into a thing mode." 248 In a statement issued on
June 13, 1990, Esquire editor-in-chief Lee Eisenberg discussed the
"'humor and irreverence" 249 that marks the magazine and noted
that "'[i]t was never the magazine's intention to offend any-
one."
250
The Sassy and Esquire incidents demonstrate that advocacy group
boycotts are not directed solely at network television. Each
magazine dealt differently with the expressed criticisms and boycott
threats. Sassy editors reacted by slightly altering their editorial
242 See Jon Carrol, She's Cute! She's Hot! She's Your Wife!, S.F. CHRON., June 18,
1990, at F12.
243 Id.; see also Your Wife: An Owner's Manual, ESQUIRE, June 1990, at 153.
244 Your Wife: An Owner's Manual, supra note 243, at 159.
245 See Susan H. Anderson, Chronicle, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1990, at B22; David
Finkel, The Last Housewife in America: A Profile of the Endangered Species, ESQUIRE,June
1990, at 102.
246 John Elvin, Inside the Beltway, WASH. TIMEs, June 14, 1990, at A6 (quoting
Tammy Bruce).
247 See Anderson, supra note 245, at B22.
248 Carrol, subra note 242, at F12 (quoting Tammy Bruce).
249 Anderson, supra note 245, at B22 (quoting Lee Eisenberg).
250 Id.
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policies to regain the confidence of the advertising community.
Esquire editors, apparently seeing and predicting few negative effects
from the NOW and Feminist Majority campaigns, simply issued an
apology. Both publishers reacted less dramatically than the
television industry does. The omnipresent and intrusive nature of
television, as compared with demographically targeted periodicals,
may explain this difference.
251
E. An Analysis of the Effect of Consumer Boycotts on Network Television
The case studies above illustrate the dynamics of advocacy group
boycotts: networks attempt to attract a large viewing audience
which, in turn, attracts corporate sponsors. Although controversial
and topical programming attracts viewers, too much controversy
frightens advertisers, who fear advocacy group boycotts. While
advertisers do not appear to be frightened by the marginal econom-
ic impact of boycotts, 252 they do fear "negative publicity and the
possibility of offending loyal customers."253 Furthermore, be-
cause advertisers are normally not involved with the production of
a program, they are "likely to withdraw their support at the first
sign of trouble."254 When faced with the choice of airing a fully
sponsored program, or absorbing the cost of a show avoided by
advertisers, the networks will choose the former. This results in an
increasingly dull and uncontroversial medium. As one commentator
observed:
By international standards American television is unfailingly bland.
Feature films are savagely cut. There is no nudity, even within a
serious dramatic context. And bad language of the barrack-room
sort is studiously avoided. Television sex is mildly titillating rather
than explicit, while violence ... is often too stylized to be
offensive. Admittedly, the casualness with which it is shown may
inure children to it.255
Indeed, the move away from issue-oriented programming has
come at an inopportune time, for broadcasting technology is
becoming increasingly sophisticated, providing more opportunity
for greater programming variety.2 56  Stifled creativity at the
251 See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
252 See Hill & Beaver, supra note 171, at 19.
2 Id.
254 Id.
255 Sex and Violence, supra note 63, at 21.
256 See Eder, supra note 1, at 38
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network level is certain to have a ripple effect on cable creativity;
the cable industry is also quite dependent on advertiser support,
albeit to a lesser degree.2 57 Therefore, while opportunities exist
for greater variety, it is likely that only the quantity, and not the
diversity, of programming will increase.
Detrimental sociological effects also result from concerted
efforts to influence programming. Corporate advertisers have
always been sensitive to consumer concerns about programming,
especially if their financial support implies a sponsorship of the
program's ideas. 258 Most of the organizations that influence the
advertisers, however, do not represent the totality of consumer
views that the boycott leaders claim for themselves.2 59  Their
actions are not checked by democratic processes, allowing a
minority group to demand that the majority adhere to its determi-
nation of what programming is acceptable. 260 Allowing a single
group to impose its standards on the rest of society deprives the
majority of its traditional voice in programming choices.
261
In addition, the effectiveness of advocacy group boycotts
appears to be correlated with the nature of the objecting group's
complaints. Those seeking to restrict access are somewhat more
effective than those attempting to gain access. For example, the
cases studied above and in Section II indicate that the dominant
advocacy group today, in terms of the quantity and effectiveness of
boycott activity, is CLeaR-TV 2  This group seeks to reduce or
eliminate programming that contradicts its conservative positions.
In contrast, status-based issue groups such as the National Gay Task
Force, which seek to increase their visibility in the medium, appear
to have less success in substantially altering programming con-
257 Although some cable stations, like Home Box Office, are supported by funds
from subscribers, many stations are not. TBS and Lifetime, for example, both rely
on commercial funding for their programs. SeeJohn Lippman, Cable TVNot Achieving
Dream of Limitless Choice, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at Al. Like the networks, these
stations are susceptible to advertiser pressure from advocacy groups.
258 See Hill & Beaver, supra note 171, at 24-26.
259 See Association ofAdvertisers Condemns Calls for Boycott of Certain TV Sponsors, 57
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1426, at 124 (July 27, 1989).
260 See id.
261 See id.
262 See supra Section II.A.
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tent.263 Many of the perspectives that these groups want present-
ed are those that conservative advocacy groups want excluded.2 6 4
Unimpeded by the censoring effects of advocacy groups,
television could provide a forum for American's diverse perspec-
tives. Individual citizens would be exposed to a more realistic view
of their society and would learn to accept that society and be
tolerant of others. Eliminating controversial issues from television
impedes this exposure, thereby diminishing citizens' social aware-
ness. Censorship paternalistically protects people from issues on
which they should be educated. Ours is a society in which some
people utter profanities, some unmarried couples engage in sexual
relations, some women have abortions, and some parents accept
their homosexual child's choice of lifestyle. By censoring these
societal elements from television broadcasts, the viewer's percep-
tions are needlessly distorted, making it more difficult for one to
understand and accept the choices that others make.
The apparent negative effects of advocacy groups boycotts,
however, should not blind one to the positive effects. Status-based
issue groups, which typically lack a direct, participatory influence
over media policy, can use consumer boycotts to correct imperfec-
tions in the media's presentation of issues. For example, women
have less power over the networks than do men.265 Through
boycott pressure, however, they can make their views known. In
this sense, advocacy group boycotts are appealing because they
resemble a democracy in which members have an economic vote.
Similarly, these protest activities provide a powerful check on the
television industry when its portrayal of a group is inaccurate or
defamatory, as exemplified by the National Gay Task Force's
success in pinpointing inaccuracies in Marcus Welby, M.D.
2 66
Thus, although advocacy group boycotts produce some negative
263 It is rare to find a series in which a recurring main character is homosexual,
although several successful programs have shown episodes dealing with homosexuali-
ty, including Designing Women, The Golden Girls, and Northern Exposure. See Rick
Dubrow, Television;Does it Cross the Line?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3,1991, Calendar Section,
at 7.
2 64 SeeJudith Graham, NBC's 'Roe'May Turn OffAdvertisers, ADVERTISING AGE,
May 1, 1989, at 1 (noting a senior advertising agency executive's description the
movie Roe vs. Wade as a "no-win situation ... [because t]he subject is just too
sensitive"); Gays FormLobby, supra note 188 (indicating that many television producers
do not want to explore the issue of homosexuality at all).265 See Claudia Puig, Entertainment: A New Women in Film Study Reports Gains for
Women in Corporate Boardrooms, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1991, at Fl.266 See supra notes 183-94 and accompanying text.
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effects, they also occasionally provide a mechanism through which
groups express their legitimate concerns.
IV. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CONSUMER BOYCOTTS
ON NETWORK TELEVISION
An effective system of media reform must address the tension
between the damaging effects of advocacy group boycotting and the
viewers' right to express their opinions concerning program
content. In an ideal broadcast industry, controversial and topical
programming would exist and advocacy groups would address
perceived inaccuracies in such programming. The following
discussion offers two proposals designed to achieve this ideal. The
first proposal, content-blind purchasing of commercial air time,
eliminates the corporate advertisers' indirect control over program-
ming content and encourages advocacy groups to address the
networks directly with their concerns. The second proposal,
increased staffing of network program standards and practices
departments with advocacy group members, provides advocacy
organizations access to program content decisions and ensures that
controversial and issue-oriented programming remains accurate and
viable.
267
267 This Comment will present each proposal as a voluntary standard to be
implemented by each of the networks. It is arguable that voluntary implementation
of either of these proposals will be significantly less effective than legal requirements.
There are, however, several difficulties in legally requiring the broadcast networks to
implement either of these proposals. It is questionable that the broadcast industry,
solely on the basis of the scarcity of broadcast airwaves and the service of the public
interest, can be subject to greater regulations than other media outlets, such as the
print media. Current case law and authorities object to a distinction in regulation
guidelines between broadcasting and print media. See Minneapolis Star Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,588 (1983) (holding-that Minnesota's
ink and paper tax violated the First Amendment because, in part, the tax singled out
the press); Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(accepting the FCC's rejection of scarcity as a rationale for differentiating between
broadcast and print media), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990); Matthew L. Spitzer, The
Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1018-20, 1022-28
(1989) (claiming that the scarcity and impact rationales for treating the two types of
media differently should be rejected). Voluntary standards, though not as readily
enforced or standardized as legal requirements, will be followed by the networks if
it is in their financial interests to do so. If the implementation of either proposal
regains more advertising revenue lost from sponsor withdrawals than it costs, it is
likely that the networks will adhere to voluntary standards.
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A. Content-Blind Purchasing of Commercial Air Time
Many critiques of an advertising-based media system center on
the media's reliance on income from commercial sponsors.
268
The propaganda model developed by Herman & Chomsky in
Manufacturing Consent identifies three specific concerns. First, in
the print media, papers and magazines offset production costs with
advertising revenue. Therefore, the copy price of advertiser-
supported publications is substantially lower than those supported
with little or no advertising revenue.269  Assuming that the de-
mand for print media decreases as its price increases, "an advertis-
ing-based system will tend to drive out of existence or into margin-
ality the media companies and types that depend on revenue from
sales alone," usually the working-class and radical papers.270
Second, as advertisers are primarily interested in targeting large,
affluent audiences, both broadcast and print media will necessarily
select and develop features and programming that attract this type
of audience.271 Third, advertisers will "choose selectively among
programs on the basis of their own principles. With rare exceptions
these are culturally and politically conservative." 272 Therefore, in
order to attract and maintain sponsors, the television networks will
often choose programming that mirrors-or, at least, does not
contradict-the advertiser's agenda. This choice directly affects the
substantive content of the media's publication or broadcast. In
short, an advertising-based media system will gradually increase
advertising and "marginalize or eliminate" controversial or topical
programming.
27 3
Most authors fail to recognize that, given the number of sponsor
withdrawals from controversial broadcasts in response to boycott
threats, an advertiser's indirect control over the content of program-
ming on television may be largely fueled by the concerted efforts of
advocacy groups. Absent the pressure of concerted activity and the
268 See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 120-53 (1983) (describing the
effect of corporate advertising expenditures on media independence); ERIK BARNOUW,
THE SPONSOR: NOTES ON A MODERN POTENTATE 79-99 (1978) (noting that
commercials sell not only products, but also an "attitude towards life"); EDWARD S.
HERMAN & NoAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT 1-35 (1988) (examining the
validity of the "propaganda model" as an explanation of mass media behavior).2 69 See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 268, at 14.
2 70 Id.
271 See id. at 16.
272 Id. at 17.
273 Id.
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ever-present threat of becoming a boycott target, corporate
advertisers would probably base their purchasing decisions on
objective factors, such as audience size and demographics, rather
than on calculations of minimal offensiveness to potential consum-
ers. Although advertising agencies will always exercise some
influence on network programming decisions, by emphasizing
programs compatible with corporate values and attractive to
consumer-oriented audiences, in the absence of boycotts, the overall
effect of their control would be greatly reduced. A system that
requires content-blind purchasing of commercial air time would
redefine the advocacy groups' perceptions of the relationship
between advertisers and the networks.
1. Corporate Sponsorship and the Move Away From It.
In the early days of television, advertisers had complete control
over programming content; the networks merely supplied the
airwaves over which the advertiser-produced shows were tele-
vised.2 74 In 1948, about fifty corporations regularly advertised on
network television; most sponsored shows on NBC. 275 Although
Bristol-Myers produced Break the Bank for ABC, and Ford Motor
Company and Liggett & Myers were the "key suppliers" of programs
for CBS (producing Ford Theater and Arthur Godfrey, respectively),
nearly thirty advertiser-sponsored shows were televised on NBC,
including Chevrolet's Chevrolet on Broadway, General Foods' Meet the
Press, and RCA Victor's Kukla, Fran & Ollie.2 76 One show epito-
mized the profitability of corporate sponsorship of television
programming. This program, The Texaco Star Theater, sponsored by
Texaco Co. and more commonly known as The Milton Berle Show,
became the most popular show in the history of television.2
77
Only three months after Milton Berle was featured, the show drew
a 78.9% share of the viewing audience in New York. 278 Despite
the program's immense popularity, the show reportedly cost
Texaco only $400,000, a "wise" investment by the company's
standards.
279
274 See Verne Gay, Television Back to the Future, ADvERTISING AGE, Nov. 9, 1988,
at 30.
275 See id.
276 See id.
277 See id.
278 See id.
279 See id.
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Although advertiser-supported shows still exist, the days of pure
corporate sponsorship disappeared in the early 1960s. 210  Since
advertiser demand for commercial air time greatly exceeds the
networks' supply,281 it has become more profitable for the net-
works to sell their advertising time in individual units. ABC was the
first major network to depart from the sponsorship tradition by
selling randomly placed commercials, in what later became known
as single scatter units.28 2 CBS and NBC followed suit and by 1968
scatter sales were the dominant buys in commercial time, thus
forming the commodity sales structure that exists today.
283
2. How Corporate Marketing Strategies Affect the
Purchase of Commercial Air Time
The modern method for purchasing advertising time on
television is a much more sophisticated and complicated than it was
in the days when The Milton Berle Show peaked in popularity. As
more demographic statistics are gathered, advertisers can selectively
purchase commercial time on programs that attract the specific
audience to which their product is targeted. In order to maximize
the efficiency in their advertising investments, advertisers purchase
network commercial television time in three different "waves."
28 4
First, the eight-week-long upfront market, in which advertising time
is sold on the basis of long-term future demographic information,
begins in mid-May or early June.285 These purchases are made
for the following television season, which starts in September and
concludes in August of the following year.286 During this time,
the major advertisers purchase "critical inventory," which is usually
second quarter (pre-summer) and fourth quarter (Christmas)
commercial time.287 The networks vary from year to year in how
much inventory is sold during this period, but the average is
between fifty and seventy percent.288 Most advertisers prefer to
280 See id.
281 See Allen Banks, TV Shares Down, Prices Up! How Come?, MARKETING & MEDIA
DECISIONs, Feb. 1983, at 57.
282 See Gay, supra note 274, at 142.
283 See id.
284 See Marianne Paskowski, No Letdown in TV Upfront Buy, MARKETING & MEDIA
DEcIsIoNs, May 1984, at 59, 60.
285 See id.
286 See id.
287 See id.
288 See id.; cf Television Wrapping Up Year With Good Fourth, BROADCASTING, Nov.
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purchase during this period, "because the rates in [the] scatter
[market] are unknown and could be increased greatly if a show
succeeds."
289
The second wave, the scatter market, are the periods preceding
each quarter.290 Here, companies adjust their advertising sched-
ules to insure that they are most efficiently targeting the appropri-
ate demographic mix of consumers. In this wave, seasonal advertis-
ers make their initial purchases. 291 The prices for time purchased
during the scatter periods are typically higher than for time
purchased during the upfront period.292
The last wave, called the opportunistic market, exists throughout
the year and involves the sale of air time that has not yet been
accounted for in programs that have been previously scheduled and
in shows that have been recently added to the programming
schedule.293 Also included in this wave are last minute purchases
of air time in programs from which advertisers have withdrawn.
When the scatter and upfront markets are strong, there is little for
buyers in the opportunistic market to purchase. When those
markets are weak, advertisers can get rates that are usually discount-
ed. 2 9 4
The availability of several purchasing options allows corporate
advertisers to target select audiences. Advertisers who sell expen-
sive items, such as luxury automobiles, to a select group of affluent,
well-educated consumers, would likely develop an advertising
campaign with an emphasis on broadcast frequency, because "it is
important to convince this small group of potential buyers through
repetition that [the automobile] is the best value for the mon-
ey. "295 This tactic, providing "high levels of fast-build frequency,"
19, 1984, at 35 (noting that in 1984 "ABC sold close to 80% of its inventory [in the]
upfront" market).
289 Kevin Goldman, Advertisers Pay Upfront, NEwsDAY, June 26, 1989, § 2, at 7.
290 See Paskowski, supra note 284, at 60.
291 See id.
292 Seeid. But see Joe Mandese, Touch Talk Upfront: TV Buyers Ask for New Price
Protection, Guarantees, ADVERTISING AGE, June 3, 1991, at 1 (noting that, although
prices during the scatter period are normally higher than during the upfront period,
"the soft network economy this past season [1990-91] sent scatter rates as much as
50% below upfront deals").
293 See Paskowski, supra note 284, at 60.
294 See id.; see also DAVID F. POLTRACK, TELEVISION MARKETING: NETWORK, LOCAL,
AND CABLE 102-06 (1983) (discussing why the rates the networks charge in the
opportunistic market are unstable).
29 5 See Robert A. Mancini, Efficiency Versus Effectiveness, MARKETING & MEDIA
DECISIONS, Aug. 1988, at 114.
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is used by many of the automobile manufacturers in the group of
programs, such as L.A. Law and 60 Minutes, that contains the
highest concentration of likely purchasers. 296 The advertiser can
only adopt this marketing strategy with an upfront purchase of
network time, as specificity of the target audience could not be
achieved as efficiently or reliably with scatter or opportunistic
purchases.
297
3. The Strengths and Weaknesses of a Content-Blind
Commercial Purchase System
A content-blind system for commercial purchases will help to
eliminate the influence that advocacy groups and corporate
advertisers have on television programming content. Under this
system, advertisers would designate the number of people they wish
to address in each demographic category and the network would
randomly assign to them commercial spots achieving this level, a
procedure which is similar to that currently employed in the upfront
market. The content-blind system would differ by limiting the
advertiser's selection process to statistics concerning audience size
and composition. The advertiser would be prohibited from
choosing or avoiding any controversial or topical programming
under the guise of preserving its corporate image.
This system would send a clear message to advocacy groups that
advertisers have no control over or input into the substantive
content of programming. In consideration for the reduction of
control and flexibility normally accorded its advertising selection
process, the corporate sponsor should be unconditionally guaran-
teed that the program mix selected by the network will produce the
required number of viewers in each demographic category, as
measured by the usual ratings system.298 This advertising-based
reform would accomplish the dual goals of subsidizing the produc-
tion of network programming while encouraging advocacy groups
to approach the networks directly with their criticisms of program
content.
299
296 See id. at 114-15.
297 See id.
298 Under the guarantee procedure, the network would refund a portion of the
advertiser's purchase price if the program does not deliver its promised share of the
audience.
299 It is difficult to determine this proposed reform's effect on the content of
programming. The networks may come under increased pressure to sensationalize
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A critical factor in the restructuring of the advertiser-network
relationship is the recognition that one of the driving forces behind
the medium's popularity with the advertising community is the
degree of specificity with which the corporation can identify its
audience. Corporate advertising decisions are often complex,
involving discussions on matters such as the state of the company's
"business ... objectives, future sales projections, competitive
environment, and viable strategic approaches" to satisfy these
business plans.300 Although a content-blind system will allow the
corporation, even absent a choice of programs, to target a specific
audience size and demographic mix, it is difficult to determine how
many corporations, if any, will refocus their advertising efforts in
other media outlets, such as newspapers, magazines, and possibly
cable and syndicated programs, where content selection is possible.
In terms of the amount of money spent on each of the advertis-
ing mediums, newspapers rank above television and periodi-
cals.30 1 Whereas much of the advertising in newspapers is local
or regional,3 °2 the advertising on network television tends to
involve national campaigns by large companies, many of whom
would probably hesitate to refocus their marketing strategies if a
content-blind purchasing system is adopted. 3  Nevertheless, as
the newspaper industry faces a weakened economy, and the growth
rate of newspaper subscribers continues to decline, 30 4 the newspa-
per industry is becoming more aggressive in attracting national
advertisers. 30 5 It is therefore possible that the combination of the
networks' content-blind purchasing system and a weakened
programming in an effort to attract a larger viewing audience. If the advertisers
demand that the network supply not only a large, but a reasonably educated, affluent
audience, then any move towards "tabloid" programming will be minimal.
300 See Mancini, supra note 295, at 114.
S01 See Alex S.Jones, Newspaper Advertising Continues to Weaken, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 1990, at D9 (noting that the amount of money spent in newspaper advertising
increased in 1989, but the rate of growth declined, while advertising in television and
magazines "also had slow growth").
302 See id.
303 See, e.g., Brenda Dalgish, Wranted: New Readers: NewspaperExecutives Are Taking
Bold Measures to Tty to Attract a Younger Audience, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 16, 1991, at 34,
35 (stating that because newspapers do not attract younger readers, advertisers prefer
television and certain periodicals to reach that market).
304 See id. at 34.
305 SeeJames Warren, Newspapers Team Up to Increase TheirAllureforNational Ads,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 1989, Business Section, at 5 (describing an attempt by five large-
circulation newspapers to jointly "lure" 41 national advertisers to purchase space in
their Sunday magazines).
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economy will encourage the newspaper industry to develop
strategies that attract disenchanted national advertisers away from
the networks.
3 0 6
Despite those strategies by newspapers, the networks may face
more competition from magazines, which, unlike newspapers, are
able to offer relatively specific demographic information compiled
from their circulation lists.30 7 In addition, special interest maga-
zines provide a forum for a company that may more consistently
conform with its corporate agenda. The editorial content of
periodicals usually does not change from article to article, or issue
to issue. A recent study seems to show that periodicals may be
more effective for advertisers than television, which suggests that
some advertisers may alter their marketing strategies.30 8  Never-
theless, no such trend is presently evident. The economic troubles
plaguing the newspaper industry are also apparent in the magazine
industry, where sixty of the top one hundred consumer magazines
have shown declines in the number of pages devoted to advertis-
ing.309 Whether this decline would continue after the networks
implement content-blind purchasing systems is difficult to predict.
The greatest competition for the networks' advertising revenue
will come from the cable industry. As more channels become
306 Determining how effective these strategies will be in changing the advertisers
preferences is difficult. Proctor & Gamble, for example, which spends over one
billion dollars a year in advertising, adheres to a "traditional" approach and "opt[s]
for television, radio and big-time magazines over newspapers." Id. Likewise, in
response to a five-newspaper joint Sunday magazine venture, an advertising
representative for Pillsbury and Tropicana stated that those companies would not be
redirecting their advertisingbudgets to the newspaperindustry either. Id. It appears
likely that companies like these, which already rely so heavily on television advertising,
would resist altering their marketing strategies in response to the new network
purchasing system.
307 See, e.g., Amy Alson, Home's New Wings: Home Magazine Publishers Hope to
Attract New Advertisers, MARKETING & MEDIA DECISIONs, Apr. 1980, at 4 (describing
home-related magazines' attempts to attract new advertisers of nonhome-oriented
products); John Klingel, The Economics of Magazine Publishing, 17 FOLIO 118 (Apr.
1988) (noting that trade magazines care more about the demographics of their
readership than do consumer magazines).
3
08 See Deirde Carmody, Survey Gives Magazines the Edge vs. TV, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 1990, at D19. Carmody notes that the respondents "preferred magazine
advertising over television advertising as a 'more appealing, informative, believable
and helpful' buying guide." Id. In addition, the results showed that the preference
for periodicals was even higher in the "upper socio-economic group, a group that
most interests advertisers." Id.
3o9 See Kim Foltz, Magazine Industy Bracingfor Shakeout as Ads Drop, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 30, 1990, at DI (noting statistics for the first quarter of 1990, kept by the
Publishers Information Bureau).
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available, each geared to a specific audience, advertisers will have
the combined benefits of both magazines and the networks. They
will be able to select an appropriate substantive forum while
maintaining the video imagery "that displays their product[s]
better."3 10 Furthermore, the increasing "'fragmentation in the
audience'" will make it much easier for advertisers to target specific
viewers. 31 1 As cable continues to erode the networks' percentage
of the viewing audience,3 12 the majority of the viewers switching
to cable are the affluent, educated consumers whom advertisers
covet.313 As the number of network television viewers decreases
and the price of network commercial time increases,3 14 advertis-
ers may find it more efficient to reach their target market through
cable television.
Even considering the advantages that other media outlets offer,
however, some companies will continue to purchase network
television time.3 15 Large, national advertisers are the least likely
to abandon network advertising. As one advertising executive
noted, "'[t]here is still no better way for a wide reach in letting
people know about a product ... than network advertising. It
remains the best buy.'" 3 16 Nevertheless, in order to compensate
advertisers for the removal of their decisionmaking ability under a
content-blind purchasing system, the networks will face increasing
310 Warren, supra note 305 (explaining some of the claims made by advertisers
who have "shunned newspapers").
311 SeeJoshua Levine, The Last Gasp of Mass Media?, FORBES, Sept. 17, 1990, at 176
(quoting Rupert Murdoch).
312 See Goldman, supra note 289 (noting that the networks' combined audience
shares decreased from 90% in 1979 to approximately 68% in 1989);Judith Reitman,
Costs Up But Cable is Still a Good Buy, MARKETING & MEDIA DECISIONS, Sept. 22, 1984,
at 49 (indicating that the networks' prime-time share of the audience "tumbled" from
89% in 1979 to 77% in 1983).
313 See Reitman, supra note 312, at 49.
314 SeeJ.L., supra note 311, at 176 (noting that the average price of 30 seconds of
network commercial time increased by 76% between 1980 and 1990).
315 See Goldman, supra note 289; Wayne Walley, TV Buyers Go Gunning for
Guarantees: Upfront Placements in Jeopardy ifBig3 Fool with Buyers' Rules, ADVERTISING
AGE, Nov. 26, 1990, at 15 (noting that, although advertisers shifted approximately
$200 million from network television to other media, "most of them ... will only
move a limited amount of ad budgets to [such other outlets as] cable TV and
syndication"); see also Fsprit's TV Drive Fields Global View: Esprit de Corp. Launches Its
First Ever Television Advertising Campaign, FOOTWEAR NEws, Aug. 19, 1991, at 51
(indicating that 70% of Esprit's eight million dollar advertising campaign was directed
toward television advertising).
316 Goldman, supra note 289 (quotingJohn Sisk, of J. Walter Thompson).
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pressure to emphasize their effectiveness in presenting advertisers'
messages to the appropriate viewers.
Any intuitive appeal of a content-blind system is somewhat
undercut, however, by the resurgent trend toward the 1940s ideas
of corporate sponsorship.3 1 7 Although it is doubtful that network
programming will ever again become advertiser-supplied, sponsors
may, at the request of the networks, re-establish advertising ties with
certain programs. The networks believe that allowing companies to
develop "sponsorship identification" with certain programs will help
the networks maintain that company's business.318 For example,
in 1988, CBS instituted a program that, in addition to sponsorship,
included corporate "promotional and merchandising support,
thereby magnifying [the] sponsor's role" in the presentation of the
program.319 As part of that agreement, CBS required corpora-
tions to underwrite the show over an extended period, possibly by
purchasing one commercial spot each week during the year.
320
The success of such sponsorship programs remains uncertain;
reports indicate that corporate advertisers do not favor them.
321
A content-blind commercial purchasing system could meet the
advertiser's economic concern of targeting the appropriate
demographic mix of viewers, while maintaining its current efficiency
levels and competitive advantages over the alternative media outlets.
The level of advertiser resistance to this possible reform is difficult
to predict.322 Although it appears that the networks are consider-
ing re-implementing, to some extent, more traditional sponsorship
ideals, a content-blind system would effectively reduce the viewer's
association of the advertiser with the content of the programming
during which its commercials appear. This result would force
317 See Gay, supra note 274, at 31.
318 See id.
319 See id.
320 See id. In addition, a premium could be included to cover promotional
expenses. See id.
321 See id. In certain situations, advertisers want their products advertised on
specific programs, because of the audience's demographic mix and the effect the
programming has on the consumer's demand for the product. For example, beer
manufacturers choose to advertise during football games not only for the large, male
audience, but also because the consumption ofbeer is often associated with watching
football games. In such instances, advertisers would resist losing the opportunity to
selectively choose the program on which their advertisements appear.
322 For example, if content-blind purchasing increases the transaction costs
associated with television advertising purchasing, some entity will be forced to bear
the cost. If advertisers do, they may choose to advertise in an alternative media
outlet.
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advocacy groups to deal with the networks directly over questions
of programming content. If the public refuses to accept this
disassociation and continues to hold the advertiser responsible for
programming content, the company may be forced to seek other
media outlets where it is guaranteed the right to selectively choose
the content in which its advertisements appear. For content-blind
reform to be successful, it must be assumed that the viewing
audience will accept the new advertiser-network relationship and
that advertisers will not take their media business elsewhere.
B. Internal Regulation Through Network Standards and Practices
Departments Staffed with Advocacy Group Members
From the early days of radio, internal censors have been a part
of network broadcasting.3 23  RCA created the "public advisory
council" when it formed NBC, the original network, in 1926.324
The twelve-member council was designed to represent "different
shades of public opinion."3 25 NBC expressed the following goal:
"In this country we must learn by experiment the best way of
handling this important agency. [NBC] is making that experiment.
It would like to demonstrate to the American people that this
agency can be handled by a private organization effectively,
economically and progressively. It would like to demonstrate that
it would respond quickly to the public taste and the public needs.
It would like to show that it would administer these facilities
without unfair discrimination and with maximum service in both
quality and quantity."
3 26
The council, which would later become known as the network's
standards and practices department (standards department), had
little responsibility during the 1950s, primarily because most shows
were produced and controlled by advertisers.3 27  Television
programming during the 1960s had less corporate sponsorship and
control.3 28  Consequently, internal regulation increased. The
responsibilities of these departments developed during this time and
included the application of the Television Code of the National
323 See The First 60 Years of NBC, BROADCASTING, June 9, 1986, at 49.
324 See id.
325 Id.
326 Id. (quoting a proclamation issued during the first meeting of the council).
327 See id. For a discussion of the nature of advertiser-sponsored programming
during this time, see supra text accompanying notes 274-79.
328 See supra text accompanying notes 280-83.
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Association of Broadcasters (NAB Code) 29 and the monitoring
of "the use of hidden commercial advertisements within the
program content."3 0 Gradually, NBC's standards department, and
others like it, exercised greater control over program content,
becoming the networks' mechanism for "quality control" from
inception through broadcast.331 Their functions included review-
ing program scripts for "language, taste and character portrayals"
and evaluating commercials to "assure [that] product claims could
be substantiated." 33 2 Recently, economic factors have forced the
networks to cut costs by reducing their standards' departments
staff.38 8  Concomitantly, massive deregulation of the industry
329 The NAB Code was enacted in 1952 and functioned to keep "governmental
regulations minimal by avoiding program practices that ... offend[ed] pressure
groups and advertisers." MARIEL G. CANTOR, PRIME-TIME TELEVISION: CONTENT AND
CONTROL 66 (1980). The NAB Code was later declared illegal as violative of antitrust
laws. See United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp. 621, 626
(D.D.C. 1982) (holding portions of NAB Code in violation of Sherman Act).
330 CANTOR, supra note 329, at 69.
331 See Morgan Gendel, The Battle for the Living Rooms of America: Network Censors:
They Decide What's In and What's Out, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1985, § 6, at 1.
312 Kevin Goldman, Change in TV 'Standards': CBS, NBC Phasing Out Offices of
Program Review, NEWSDAY, Aug. 17, 1988, § H, at 15. In addition to monitoring
programs specifically made for the networks, the standards departments also
scrutinize programs made for other media, such as feature films, that are to be shown
on network television. See Cathy Seidner & Kimon P. Timon, Preserving Intangible
Rights in Films Shown on Television, N.Y. LJ., May 25, 1990, at 5. In this capacity, the
department "decides what editing will be necessary for purposes of censorship, time
constraints, and adding of advertising matter." Id. In addition to auditing program
content, the departments also monitor the accuracy and appropriateness of the
advertisements themselves. Such decisions are often as controversial as those made
concerning the programs. For example, in 1986, CBS's standards department
rejected a commercial for Maybelline's Shine Free mascara because there was concern
that the "fast-action, quick-cut commercial ... could trigger seizures in some
epileptics." Pat Sloan, CBS Nixes Maybelline's SFX, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 27, 1986,
at 41. Network standards departments, however, seem to be relaxing some
restrictions and are approving "franker" commercials. See Stuart Elliott, GANNETT
NEWS SERVICE, July 31, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File. For
example, the networks allowed bras to be worn on live models in 1987, Playtex
commercials being the first, because they were "tastefully executed." See Aliza Laufer,
Grey & Partners' Uplift Playtex, First to Bare Bra, BACK STAGE, May 1, 1987, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bckstg File (stating that the ads were designed to
move away from sexuality and "position the product on a wholesome, look-good, feel-
good attitude"). Also acceptable for use in TV commercials are the words "diarrhea,"
for Kaopectate, and "period," for feminine hygiene products. See Elliott, supra.
333 The networks' financial considerations stem, in part, from the increased
competition they face from the cable and home video markets. Seesupra notes 310-14
and accompanying text. In addition, the highly publicized takeover challenges and
ownership changes at the three largest networks (Capital Cities Communication's
purchase of ABC, General Electric's acquisition of NBC's parent company; RCA,
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during the Reagan era led networks to televise more controversial
and topical programming in an attempt to regain viewership lost to
competing cable stations. 3 4  The result was a proliferation of
protests by advocacy groups and the increased use of consumer
boycotts.
As advocacy groups gain influence over the substantive conduct
of programming by boycotting, networks must develop a method for
adequately addressing their concerns. History suggests that this
might be accomplished by staffing network standards departments
with advocacy group members.
3 3 5
1. The Deregulation of the Reagan Era and the
Television Program Improvement Act of 1990
During the Reagan administration, the FCC began to deregulate
"aggressively" the broadcast industry.3 3 6 Television stations were
no longer required to meet with community groups,337 and their
obligation to show public affairs and news programs was re-
moved. 3 8 Later, the Fairness Doctrine was abolished, since it was
believed that "the public interest would be better served if market-
Laurence Tisch's control over CBS after unsuccessful acquisition attempts by Ted
Turner and Senator Jesse Helms) have also affected the "bottom line." See
MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 221; Gendel, supra note 331 (stating that "[t]elevision
has become just another commodity"). As a result of these financial pressures, the
standards departments of each of the networks has been either reduced in staff or
eliminated completely. See e.g, John Carmody, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1988, at C8
(indicating that ABC began to reduce its standards department during the 1986
acquisition by Capital Cities); Kenneth R. Clark, Times Mellow, But Censors Are Still
Busy as Beavers, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1988, Tempo Section, at 1 (indicating that CBS
cut its standards staff from 80 to 29); Bill Powell, What Ever Happened to the "Content
Police"?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 14, 1988, at 78 (noting that CBS' and NBC's "wrenching
corporate reorganizations" eliminated standards groups as separate departments).
But see Tom Shales, Attack of the TV Reformers: The Aft, math of a Season, WASH. POST,
June 25, 1989, at GI (explaining NBC's announcement to re-staff its department "to
better monitor program content").
334 See Peter Funt, What's Allowed on TV-Pressures for Change Are Mounting, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1980, § 2, at 1 (noting that network programming decisions are
changing because "'cable's programming of explicit sex and violence is already
affecting what is deemed acceptable for home viewing'" (quoting an ABC official));
Shales, supra note 333 (describing the networks as being "at the most vulnerable
position of their corporate lives [because of] lower ratings, more competition, [and]
chaning viewer habits").
For a comprehensive discussion of the networks' past attempts to manage
advocacy groups, see MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 51-74.
336 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 219; Hill & Beaver, supra note 171, at 19-20.
317 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 219.
338 See id.
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place forces were allowed to operate, unfettered by government
[regulations.]"33 9 In effect, the environment for the networks
changed from one of government regulation to "self-regulation"
within the broadcast industry.3 40  As Professor Montgomery
describes the change in Target: Prime-Time, the expectations in the
broadcast industry were rather "utopian":
Any limitations in the present system would be overcome by
emerging new communication technologies which would create a
more equitable and diverse system; satellite-delivered cable
networks would cater to almost every special interest; new low-
power broadcast stations would make it possible for virtually
anyone to become a broadcaster; and public access cable channels
would become the new "electronic soap box," providing a forum
for those shut out by traditional broadcasting.
3 4'
Such reform has not occurred, and several studies indicate that
the networks have seen "little improvement" in community-affairs
problems. 342 If anything, the decrease in government regulation
appears to have been met with a noticeable increase in the number
of advocacy group boycotts.A43 The public's concern for quality
network programming has regained the attention of Congress,
which recently passed legislation to encourage the curtailment of
television violence. The Television Program Improvement Act of
1990 (Television Act), 44 signed by President Bush on December
1, 1990, provides a three-year antitrust exemption "for television
networks, local stations, producers, and the cable television industry
to develop and disseminate voluntary guidelines" to reduce
television violence.3 45 The purpose of the Television Act is to
9 Id. at 220. For a discussion of the Fairness Doctrine and its applicability to
television programming, see supra note 148.
340 Hill & Beaver, supra note 171, at 19.
34 MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 220.
342 See Hill & Beaver, supra note 171, at 19 (citing Eric J. Zanot, Unseen But
Effective Advertising Regulation: The Clearance Process, 14 J. ADVERTISING 26 (1985));
Robert G. Wyckham, Self-Regulation of Sex-Role Stereotyping in Advertising: The
Canadian Experience, 6J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING, at 76 (1987).
343 Another contributing factor could be the reduced staff in the networks'
standards departments. See supra note 333.
344 The Television Program Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 501,
104 Stat. 5089, 5127-28 (1990) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 303c (West 1991))
[hereinafter Television Act].
345 Sponsors of Law Granting Immunity Urge Broadcasters to Move Quickly, 59
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1495, at 863 (Dec. 13, 1990) [hereinafter
Sponsors of Law]; see also 47 U.S.C.A. § 303c(c). Absent this exemption, industry
members would be prohibited from any "joint discussions or actions" by the Sherman
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encourage representatives from various segments of the industry to
develop their own guidelines concerning "when, how and how much
violence should be depicted on television,"346 thus eliminating the
need to re-establish restrictive governmental or regulatory control.
According to its sponsors, Democratic Representative Dan
Glickman of Kansas and Democratic Senator Paul Simon of Illinois,
the Television Act responds to various studies which found that
television violence had a detrimental effect on audiences, especially
children.3 47 In a December 12, 1990, letter to network executives,
the sponsors characterized the law as creating "'an opportunity, not
an obligation,'" and urged the executives to use the exemption "'to
respond to the calls of parents, teachers, and mental health
professionals for less violent television for our nation's child-
ren.'"348 The sponsors noted that the "'law respects First Amend-
ment freedom and is not coercive: Congress is not telling the
television industry how to write the guidelines, and there is no
penalty if nothing results from joint discussions.
'" 349
Although the networks did not oppose the Television Act,
350
CBS expressed its resistance to "any form of government interven-
tion."35 1 ABC deemed the bill unnecessary, thinking its own
standards department sufficient.3 52 NBC expressed a willingness
"to engage in dialogues."358 Whatever the result of the proposed
discussions among the networks, the implications of the Television
Act are twofold. First, Congress sent a message to the television
industry that "voluntary" standards should be enacted to avoid
further legislation.354 Second, the antitrust exemption provides
Act. See Kevin Goldman, A Move to Consider Prime-Time Violence, NEWSDAY, July 4,
1989, § 11, at 7.
346 TV Industry Urged to Draft Violence Rules, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1990, at P10.
347 See id.
348 Sponsors of Law, supra note 345, at 863 (quoting a letter by Dan Glickman and
Paul Simon).
349 Robert Shepard, TV Industry Urged to Curb Violence, UPI, Dec. 12, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (quoting Dan Glickman).
350 See Goldman, supra note 345, at 7.
351 Id.
352 See id.
353 Matt Roush, Congress TougherAbout Violence on TV, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 1989,
at 3D.
354 Congress expressed the goal that the industry develop voluntary standards.
As Senator Paul Simon wrote in the Chicago Tribune, "I do not want government
censorship. Any guidelines would be industry-written and voluntary." The Need for
Restraint on TV Violence, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 1989, Perspective Section, at 20 (Letter
of Senator Paul Simon).
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the industry with the unique opportunity to develop guidelines
regarding the depiction of violence. Should that effort be success-
ful, it would signal to Congress the need for similar legislation
regarding advocacy group boycotts and their effect on substantive
programming content.355 During this time, the networks could
implement guidelines providing for standards departments staffed
with advocacy group members.
2. The Method and Advantages of Staffing Standards Departments
with Advocacy Group Members
Most of the contact that the networks have with advocacy groups
has been on an informal, ad hoc basis.3 56 Network representa-
tives readily admit that they "rarely, if ever" receive feedback
concerning programming from such groups.3 57  Instead, they
learn of an advocacy groups' concerns indirectly, when a targeted
advertiser removes its commercials from a network's program.
3 5 8
To prevent this, the networks should solicit information from
advocacy groups directly through a formal mechanism-their own
standards departments.
In his article, Pressure Groups and Television Entertainment, Joseph
Turow details four general aims for standards departments: (1)
limiting the influence that advocacy groups have on the substantive
content of programming; (2) keeping conflicts between advocacy
groups and the networks from entering into the governmental or
advertising arenas; (3) ensuring that whatever programming changes
are made do not weaken the "predictability and profitability of the
network-producer-advertiser relationships;" and (4) deterring other
advocacy groups "from believing that their attacks on the networks
will be successful."3 59  Thus, the standards departments have
censorial and public relations functions. In the censorship capacity,
the department should insure that program content is less likely to
3ss The Act only allows for the development of "guidelines designed to alleviate
the negative impact of violence in telecast material." Television Act, supra note 344,
at § 501(c) (emphasis added).
856 See Hill & Beaver, supra note 171, at 21-22 (noting that "none of the networks
ha[ve] any formal policies regarding interaction with advocacy groups, and most
handle advertiser concerns on a 'case-by-case' basis").
-17 See id. at 21.
358 See id.
359 JOSEPH TUROW, PRESSURE GROUPS AND TELEvIsION ENTERTAINMENT, in
INTERPRETING TELEVISION: CURRENT RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 142, 151-52 (Willard
D. Rowland & Bruce Watkins eds. 1984).
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be subjected to government and public sector criticism,36 0 thereby
eliminating the need for increased government regulation or
advertiser withdrawal. In the public relations role, the department
should handle viewer complaints as a "buffer" for the network,
producer, and advertisers.
3 6 1
These responsibilities can best be handled by people who
understand and support the advocacy group's agendas. Professor
Montgomery explains that during the 1970s the networks saw the
need for hiring people in the standards departments who "could
represent advocacy group interests." 362  The networks began
touting their standards departments as "microcosms of pluralistic
American society, staffed not only with blacks, Hispanics, women,
and Asians but also with senior citizens, Catholics, and gays."
363
Professor Montgomery also notes that some of the networks
"employed members of advocacy organizations such as the NAACP
and Nosotros." 64 The questions are (1) whether boycotts could
be avoided if these efforts were expanded, and (2) what effect such
staffing will have on program content.
Professor Montgomery's account of network hiring practices
does not explain the extent to which the members of the standards
departments actually represented advocacy group interests.
3 65 If
these departments are to succeed, members of organizations such
as CLeaR-TV, the National Gay Task Force, and the National Right
to Life Organization equally must be part of the departments'
composition.366  A gay or Christian employee would not be
360 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 53.
361 See id.
362 Id. at 71.
363 Id.; see also Diane Haithman, The TV Western Rides Again, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 20,
1989, § 6, at I (noting that ABC had an American Indian in its standards department,
and that the networks "no longer tolerate the kind of stereotyping that was rife in the
old Westerns").
364 MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 71.
365 Furthermore, if Hill & Beaver's account of network perceptions is accurate, it
is apparent that whatever contact networks did have with advocacy groups in the past
has certainly eroded. See supra notes 356-58 and accompanying text.
366 The need for the inclusion of a diverse range of interests in these departments
is illustrated by the recent controversy over ABC's comedy Good &Evil. The National
Federation of the Blind (NFB) attacked the portrayal of a blind character on the show
as "a bungling fool, an inept idiot." William Mahoney, ABC Backs "Good & Evi4 "
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Sept. 16, 1991, at 2. ABC refused to alter the show, noting that
it had been approved by its standards department, who claimed the program to be
an "outrageous parody" in which "'not one character is intended to be realistic or
believable.'" Id. (quoting an ABC spokesperson). NFB threatened a boycott, and four
companies responded by pulling their advertisements from the program. See Verne
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sufficient. A network may, for public relations reasons, hire a
person of the necessary race, religion, or sexual orientation who
they know does not support the corresponding advocacy group.
When a member of an advocacy group is hired, it is critical that that
person have influence over the actions of their group. Thus, a
formalized, expanded version of 1970s hiring practices may succeed
in containing conflicts within the networks.
This hiring system will lead to ideological differences within the
standards department. Therefore, the staff must be forced to make
internal compromises when it disagrees. A particularly effective
framework for this mechanism has been discussed by Ronald Hill
and Andrea Beaver in their investigation of advocacy group
behavior. 367 The authors assert that "conflict holds the potential
for positive outcomes, including the development of new and
creative solutions."368  Nevertheless, they recognize that such
conflict "'also can produce emotional confrontations in which
participants rely on overt power manipulation, threats, coercion,
and deception.'
369
Therefore, efforts must be made to emphasize cooperative,
rather than competitve, interaction "characterized by problem-
solving approaches that are concerned with identifying mutual
interests, goals, and desires."370  When agreement cannot be
reached, a "responsible decision-maker" approach could be
employed.3 7 1 This entity would make a decision to which the
department must adhere when their own deliberations are not
successful.3 72 The solution is "revealed" to the group during their
discussions if they are unable to reach an agreement without it, "but
before a final vote regarding alternatives is taken. Thus, disagree-
ment, in effect, becomes agreement on the choice provided by the
reasonable decision-maker."
373
Gay, Four 'Good & Evil" Advertisers Yank Ads, NEWSDAY, Oct. 18, 1991, at 99.
S67 See Hill & Beaver, supra note 171.3 68 Id. at 20 (citing JOSEPH P. FOLGER & MARSHALL SCOIT POOLE, WORKING
THROUGH CONFLICT (1984)).369 Id. (quoting Michael J. Papa & Elliott A. Pood, Coorientational Accuracy and
Differentiation :n the Management of Conflict, 15 CoMM. RES. 400, 400 (1988)).370 Id. (citing Tricia S. Jones, Phase Structures in Agreement and No-Agreement
Mediation, 15 CoMM. RES. 470 (1988)).
71 Id. at 27 (citing Russell L. Ackoff, A Theory of Practice in the Social Systems
Sciences, SYs. RES., 3, 241-46 (1988)).
372 See id.
373 Id.
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Use of this decisionmaking process by advocacy-staffed stan-
dards departments would allow the networks to maintain control
over the substantive content of their programs and formalize their
relationships with each advocacy organization. 74 Thus, "criticism
[of the network] could be channeled into a manageable form."
75
It is unlikely that an advocacy group will protest or boycott a
programming decision when a member of its organization has
played a vital role in the program's development. Furthermore, the
advocacy-affiliated member of the standards department will have
presumably relayed to his organization accounts of previous
victories in changing other programs.
Apart from the procedural efficiencies created when advocacy
group members become part of the internal process, this proposal
could benefit the networks substantively. Recent successful
relationships between the networks and various advocacy groups
illustrate this point. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee (AAADC), 376 which monitors Arab stereotyping in the
media,377 was able to alter the negative characterization of an
Arab in ABC's Dynasty, and they convinced the producer of Cagney
and Lacey to balance the portrayal of an Arab murderer with an
Arab female doctor.8 78 Eventually, ABC began consulting with
AAADC and sought its comments on scripts featuring Arab
characters. 79 Another example of the effectiveness of advocacy-
group input is the CBS drama Tour of Duty, in which the producers
were "unusually solicitous" to Vietnam veterans during produc-
tion. 80 Advice for the show was sought from several veterans,
and "special screenings" were also organized. 8 ' The president of
the Vietnam Veterans of America, who cooperated in the hope that
374 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 54 (characterizing the networks' ability to
centralize these elements as "essential").
375 id.
376 AAADC is an organization "devoted to combating the repugnant images of
Arabs that... pervade American life." David K. Shipler, The Arab-American Counts
His Stereotypes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1985, at B6.
377 See id. Arab-Americans object to being characterized as greedy, dishonest,
violent thieves. See id. They feel many of these images result from Middle East
tensions, the increases in oil prices in the 1970s, and "19th-century images... of the
Arab as primitive keepers of harems." Id.
378 See id.
379 See id. Shipler writes that a representative from ABC indicated that that
network consulted with members of other minority groups as well, "and their
objections frequently result[ed] in revisions." Id.
380 See Is It Prime-Time for Vietnam?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1987, § 2, at 1.
381 See id.
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the program would "bring Vietnam veterans out of solitary
introspection," hailed the series' depiction of the war as "'accu-
rate.'"3 82 The success that the networks have had in working with
advocacy groups on an informal basis suggests that a formal
mechanism-advocacy-staffed standards departments-could be
successful in defusing advocacy groups otherwise driven to boycott-
ing the networks' advertisers.
3. The Weaknesses of Advocacy-Staffed Network
Standards Departments
Although advocacy group-staffed network standards departments
appear to provide a mechanism that would control advocacy group
input, several concerns must be addressed. First, it is possible that
organizations such as CLeaR-TV that already enjoy a certain level of
influence in the industry will refuse to participate in any program
that requires compromises and concessions. To them, it may be
impossible to present a balanced portrayal of an abortion or
homosexuality issue. Nevertheless, if the participation of the
majority of advocacy groups can be secured, and if the corporate
sponsors agree to a moratorium period in which they refrain from
withdrawing commercials, then groups such as CLeaR-TV may be
forced to choose between effecting change as an insider or exerting
less power as an outsider.
Also unclear are the types of network actions needed to satisfy
advocacy group concerns. There are two types of controls that an
advocacy group may make in a network standards department: an
affirmative action, where the group is provided with the opportunity
to introduce an original idea, and a negative action, where the
group is able to eliminate an already-existing idea from a program.
Advocacy groups may view their compromise responsibilities as only
a negative action "veto-power" over existing program content,
rather than as an affirmative action opportunity to gain access or
visibility for their ideas. For example, CLeaR-TV may focus its
efforts on eliminating "objectionable" content from programming,
while the National Gay Task Force will be concerned with increasing
homosexual visibility. Rather than include that which is immediate-
ly objectionable to another member of the department, the network
may choose to restrict the department to censorial, negative actions.
But increasing a group's censorship power without increasing its
382 Id. (quoting Robert Muller, president of the Vietnam Veterans of America).
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access power will favor the conservative/religious and anti-violence
agendas and marginalize the concerns of social-action and status-
based issue groups.
In addition, the compromises reached by a department of varied
viewpoints may adversely effect network programming. Balanced
portrayals of characters can sometimes strengthen a program. For
example, in the 1970s ABC comedy Soap, the standards department
emphasized balance, especially concerning the program's depiction
of characters affiliated with the Mafia.38 3 With each reference to
the Mafia, it was "'necessary to introduce a principal continuing
character of Italian descent who [was] very positive and who ....
through the dialogue and action, balance[d] and counter[ed] any
negative stereotypes.'"384 Although such compromises could
enhance a program, the balanced portrayal of a more controversial
issue may be more difficult. Too much compromise may lead to
programs in which "'controversial issues are consistently and
carefully balanced within each program so that one clear argument
cannot be discerned.'"38 5  When a writer's goal is to present a
"strong point of view-not necessarily shrill and tendentious, but
passionate and committed,"3 8 6 imposing balance upon such a
viewpoint may eliminate the "dramatic urgency" from the work. 87
The final concern in implementing this reform is the receptive-
ness of the creative community, some of whom will object to the
intrusiveness of the advocacy-staffed standards departments in
shaping program content.38 8 Resistance to standards departments
influence already exists. The producer of thirtysomething has
explained that he was always in "intense battles" with ABC's
383 See Walter Goodman, Commercial TV Gets Commercial Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 1989, at C13.
384 Id. (quoting a rule of ABC's standards department).
385 Id. (quoting Kathryn Montgomery).
386 Stephen Farber, They Watch What We Watch, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1989, § 6, at
42.
387 See id. What is more disturbing is the elimination of a program in its entirety.
The documentary AIDS: Changing the Rules and related 30-second public service
announcements were rejected by standards departments because they "were too
explicit in presenting their safer-sex message." Clarke Taylor, "Changing the Rules*
on Aids Education, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1987, § 6, at 32. The program was eventually
aired on PBS. A frustrated producer commented, "[w]e're grateful to PBS, but the
reality is, we'll reach a much smaller audience than we initially intended." Id.
388 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 386 (indicating that "most of the writers, producers
and directors who contend with the networks' broadcast standards process feel it
intrudes painfully on their creative freedom").
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standards group.38 9 In one episode, the standards department
objected to a character's comment that "the Government cut safety
regulations 'so the car companies can make more money.'
390
After a struggle, the standards department allowed the government
criticism, but deleted the reference to the automobile industry.
91
Although the standards department agreed that the statement
"might be true," they felt that the comment would offend the
programs' advertisers. 92 Similarly, the producer of China Beach
described a "constant struggle" with ABC's standards group over the
depiction of drugs, 98 stating that "[d]rugs are a difficult territory,
but they were very much a part of the picture during the Vietnam
War." 94 The creative community's resistance to standards de-
partment interference was the focus of a University of Southern
California seminar entitled the "Future of Television." 95 Several
producers expressed outrage over the increased interference that
standards departments have with their programs. L.A. Law
producer Steven Bocho commented, "'I've had more fights [with the
networks] in the past year than I've had in the last six to eight years
put together.'8 396 These battles would presumably continue if
standards departments are to become so influential that they would
avoid advocacy group boycotts.
Nevertheless, just as network censors have always been a part of
the industry, some producers are accustomed to obtaining network
approval over their creative decisions. 97 Producing a program
for network television requires a willingness to work within a system
389 See id.
390 Id.
391 See id.
392 See id. Farber also describes the problems that the writer/co-producer of Roe
vs. Wade had in making sure that the lawyer who argued the case before the Supreme
Court wasn't portrayed too sympathetically, noting that "[v]irtually every word and
image [in the film] was scrutinized and modified." Id. Although she believed that the
end product "turned out well.... there were times when I worried if I had become
a good German and given up the heart of the piece." Id.
393 Bill O'Hallaren & Joanna Elm, Dana Delany's Real.Life War Stories, PR
NEWSWIRE, June 8, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File.
3 94 
Id.
395 Diane Haithman, Panel Finds TV Technologically Daring Conservative in Content,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1989, § 6, at 10.3 98 Id. (quoting Stephen Bocho).
397 See MONTGOMERY, supra note 7, at 200.
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less flexibile than the motion picture or recording industries.
3 98
As one producer told Professor Montgomery:
"I look at it this way: there are certain rules in writing for
television, certain preconditions. It's not any good to complain
about them. This is reality .... [The standards and practices
departments] are often right from their point of view. They might
not be right objectively in what would be better for the show, but
they're right from the amount of trouble-'use this line and this is
what is going to happen.'"
3 9 9
By incorporating advocacy groups into standards departments,
all participants in the industry will be forced to make compromises.
While some of the demands made by advocacy groups will seem
unjustified, there will be occasions when their complaints will have
merit. When an advocacy group has a justifiable criticism, the
networks will be able to address their concern during the produc-
tion process. When the complaints are not valid, however, the
networks will be able to explain their reasons for remaining
committed to the program and the advocacy group member will be
able to relay this information to her group's members. The present
feedback system, on the other hand, fueled by boycott-driven
economic coercion, eliminates the network's opportunity to
reasonably address the concerns of a diverse viewing public.
398 The networks, however, are not alone in their use of standards departments.
Lifetime Medical Television, a cable station, has a standards department and a
medical review department. See Phillips Huston, Surviving in a Get-Tough-On-
Promotion Climate: Pharmaceutical Industry Included Articles on Histoiy, MED.
MARKETING & MEDIA, June 1991, at 40. Even MTV, the 24-hour music network, has
a standards group that applies "broadcast-network standards about language, violence
and nudity" to the music videos it broadcasts. SeeJane Hall, The Channel That Ate the
World, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1991, Calendar Section, at 6. The application of these
standards has led to MTV's ban of a Billy Idol video featuring a "woman being
burned on a cross," as well as the controversial Madonna videoJustify My Love, which
included nudity and themes of voyeurism and group sex. See id.; David Wharton,
Drop Another Quarter in Your TV Set, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1991, Calendar Section, at
21A; cf. Lynne Olson, 9 WORKING WOMAN 90, Feb. 1984 (noting that many producers
and writers in the creative community submit their projects to Home Box Office,
instead of the networks, because of its "filmmaking flexibility").
399 Id. (quoting Interview with Charlie Hauck, in Los Angeles, Cal. (July 11,
1985)).
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CONCLUSION
Although advocacy groups have had varied success influencing
the programming content of network television, their aggregate
impact has been substantial. From Donald Wildmon's CLeaR-TV to
the National Gay Task Force, these organizations have used
powerful weapons, including consumer boycotts of advertisers
sponsoring "objectionable" programming, in their efforts to shape
television programming. As corporate advertisers become more
fearful of the groups' tactics, controversial and topical programming
will be reduced or eliminated.
Since advertiser boycotts are constitutionally protected under
Claiborne Hardware and Environmental Planning, an advocacy group's
activities cannot be regulated without violating their constitutional
rights. The two media reforms discussed in this Comment, content-
blind commercial purchasing and advocacy-staffed standards and
practices departments, if voluntarily adopted, would reduce the
influence of advocacy groups over programming content. Content-
blind commercial purchasing would redefine the advertiser-network
relationship by disassociating the corporate sponsor from the
content of the program on which it advertises. Standards depart-
ments staffed with advocacy group members can provide a mecha-
nism in which advocacy groups express their concerns and produc-
ers incorporate controversial issues into programs that attract
viewers, not protesters. Each proposal would reduce the detrimen-
tal effects of advocacy group boycotts, while maintaining the
economic advantages of an advertising-based broadcasting industry.
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